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UNDUE INFLUENCE, CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP, AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TRANSFERENCE
Thomas L. Shaffer*
This article attempts to describe a common human relationship as it has
been developed in two traditions which are today largely separated from one
another. The relationship is referred to as "confidential" in the law and as "transference" in psychoanalytical psychology. Legal insight on the phenomenon is
found mainly in the appellate literature on gratuitous transfers obtained by
undue influence; psychological insight occurs in the practice and speculation of
therapists who have discovered the phenomenon in psychotherapy. Both traditions are useful in understanding the confidential or transference factor in human
interaction. The interaction itself has impact beyond the appellate cases or the
practice of psychotherapy. It is, for one relevant instance, of central importance
in legal counseling.
I. A Psychiatric Case Study of Transference and the Law
One of the clinical case reports in Dr. K. R. Eissler's book, The Psychiatrist and the Dying Patient,' suggests a model that might integrate both
aspects of the prototype undue influence case - the legal tradition and the
psychodynamics of what is known, in the legal tradition, as "confidential relationship."
Dr. Eissler treated a dying, middle-aged woman during the last three years
of her life, from an early point in her last illness until she died. He then became
defendant in a lawsuit involving her will; her family contended he had exercised
undue influence on his patient.
Dr. Eissler treated this lady during three periods in the last three years of
her life. She first consulted him, for about three months, while her husband was
dying. A second treatment period of about eight months commenced after the
husband's death and terminated when the patient moved away from Dr. Eissler's
city. When she returned, about ten months later, treatment was resumed. This
final phase ended with the patient's death fourteen months after the latest resumption of therapy.
Treatment during the periods immediately before and after the husband's
death consisted largely of resolving the woman's "slavish dependency" upon her
husband and converting her from a "social doll" to a self-reliant and competent
businesswoman able to take over her dead husband's affairs. Dr. Eissler's
prognosis was optimistic when she left his care to build a new life in another
state.
The terminal phase of treatment began when the patient returned to her
husband's old home and again consulted Dr. Eissler.
* Associate Dean, Notre Dame Law School.
1 K. BISSLER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE DYING PATIENT 144-47, 200-40 (1955).
Copyright 1955 by International Universities Press, Inc. Quotations used by permission of the
publisher.
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When I met her, her physical appearance alarmed me. She was paler
than usual, underweight, and short of breath. She coughed from time to
time but was sure that her physical symptoms as well as the nightly attacks
of anxiety which had started a few weeks earlier were psychogenic. She
had been carefully examined in 0as well as upon her arrival in
G, but no physical pathology responsible for the cough had been
detected. She spoke with great anger of her relative, reporting a few incidents which had made her stay in 0
unbearable and reproached
me for ever having her go to 0. She was determined to stay
in C - , never to return to 0, and to stand on her own feet
from then on. She felt independent and was certain that she could now
manage her affairs successfully, because she had left 0against her
family's advice, had prepared the move alone, and had traveled alone,
something of which she had previously been afraid. She was disturbed only
by the reappearance of anxiety at night and by the cough. She begged me
to help her in getting rid of these symptoms so that this time nothing would
stand in the way of her fulfilling the great wish which she had had since
early youth, namely to live an independent life. A brief exploration revealed
that shortly before the onset of her nervous cough and anxiety, a person
who had played an important role in her life had died. This suggested a
connection between the nervous cough, the return of anxiety, and a feeling
of guilt which she habitually tended to develop after the death of a person
n2
close to her.
Dr. Eissler referred the patient for further physical examination, despite
indications that she was not physically ill, and learned that she had "an inoperable malignancy.... [D]eath would prematurely stop the patient who had,
against heavy odds, rallied all her resources in order to realize finally some of
the potentialities which seemed to have been dormant in her."'
Dr. Eissler and the internist who examined the patient agreed that she
should not be told she was dying; they conspired in what they thought benign
deceit and told her that she had a minor disorder. They decided that "she should
be kept ignorant of the gravity of her state, encouraged to maintain her optimism
and her morale, and prevented from falling into a depression." Dr. Eissler believed that a more candid relationship "would have precipitated severe psychopathology." 4
At about this time (and possibly as evidence against Dr. Eissler's belief that
she didn't know she was dying) the patient began to talk to him about her will.
Shortly after her return from 0the patient had told me that
if she knew she were dying, she would change her will instantly and distribute part of the money which had been allocated in a previous will to
her quasi-adopted daughter to other relatives, who were in need of financial
assistance. But since she was assured that her sickness was benign, she did
not see any reason to proceed in a hurry. Pointedly - and evidently in
order to test me - she added that she was certain that I, since I had never
let her down, would tell her to make a will now if her life were in danger.
2 Id. at 206-07.
3 Id. at 207.
4 Id. at 208. Dr. Eissler thinks that this involves a denial of death and a strong motivation to be free of the pain of death. Id. at 46, 130. This means that the patient wants the doctor
to keep the fact of impending death a secret - even though he may in his fibers know that
death is coming. Id. at 48-50.
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A decision to make myself instrumental in the preservation of the patient's
illusion of approaching recovery thus might have had detrimental consequences for some of her relatives, inasmuch as they would obtain less of her
estate if she died prior to executing a new will. However, I decided that
the patient's mental and emotional welfare had to be my paramount goal
even though, if all circumstances were known to the members of her family,
I wouldbe liable to the justified complaints of those who might be injured
by the patient's premature death. I am fully aware that I might be censured
by some members of the medical and juridical professions for such an
opinion, but I do not see how a different decision can be made if the patient's
welfare is made the physician's uppermost goal, which, after all, it should be.
However, after some time - it was two weeks before her demise she did decide to change her will and seemed relieved after she had accomplished this. From a previous experience I knew that she was the
victim of superstitions with regard to the making of a will, and that she had
to go through a struggle before she found enough resolution to do anything
active in testamentary matters. 5
That resolved, Dr. Eissler had to decide how he would handle his patient as the
disease accomplished its final end - a painful, slow, disfiguring death. He decided to "make use of the strong affectionate tie which the patient had formed
and of the feeling of omnipotence she had projected upon me."' This was "contrary to the usual technique applied in treatment of neurotics, when the growth of
transference beyond the physiological optimum must be immediately reduced
to combat the patient's illusionary belief in the therapist's omnipotence."' The
regimen worked, or so Dr. Eissler thought at the time.
The outbreaks of anger against her relative softened, and when she expressed the feeling that she seemed able now to forgive her, she seemed well
on the way to achieving internal peace. She died in her sleep, without ever
having consciously doubted that she was on the way to recovery, and to
the end she believed that I had saved her life by sending her to an internist
and that she would soon embark upon an active life in the pursuit of longcherished ambitions. 8
The patient "died without conscious knowledge of the fatal nature of her
disease," he says, "but was convinced - in conformity with the content of my
communications and those of the other physicians who treated her - that she
suffered from a minor disorder." 9 He had seen this lady before he knew that her
disease was fatal, under a normal professional relationship (e.g., he billed her for
his services), but he changed this procedure when he knew she was dying; from
that point on he did not mention fees to her.
[U]nder ordinary circumstances this would be a strange procedure, and
5 Id. at 208-09.
6 Id. at 209.
7 Id. at 210.
8 Id. The ego activity changes as death approaches and the patient becomes more capable
of acts of forgiveness, kindness, and personal growth. See also Zinker & Fink, The Possibility
for PsychologicalGrowth in a Dying Person, 74 J. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 185 (1966); Joseph,
Transference and Countertransference in the Care of a Dying Patient, 49 PsYcHOANALYss &
PsYcHoANALYTic Rv. 21 (1962).
9 K. EissLan, supra note 1, at 144.
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logically the patient should have inquired about it. However, during this
period she took for granted my not bothering her with financial obligations
and did not draw any conclusions, although one might have expected that
this circumstance alone would have aroused her suspicion that an essential
change must have occurred in her condition. 0
Not only did Dr. Eissler give this lady free psychiatric treatment, he also presented
gifts to her; both actions were, he says, a way of conveying "the therapist's
animistic conviction of the patient's immortality," and "helped the patient to
maintain a strongly represented future.""
Shortly after the patient's death, Dr. Eissler was informed by counsel that
she had named him executor of her will and had left him "a considerable legacy."
After some soul-searching, he decided to refuse the legacy; he specified to counsel
that it be given to charity. He accepted the executorship, however, because he
thought he could thereby avoid family strife. The patient's heir then filed suit,
alleging that Dr. Eissler's legacy was the result of his undue influence over the
testatrix. The suit was ultimately settled - with Dr. Eissler receiving no benefit
from the estate - but not without an obviously unsettling experience for the
physician.
Dr. Eissler writes both as an expert in the psychodynamics of confidential
relationship and as one who wears the scars of legal battle. He notes first of
all that usual relationship of "positive transference" had developed between himself and the patient - that is, she had fastened upon him emotions that were
out of place in the reality of the doctor's office; she was, to oversimplify, inappropriately affectionate toward him. This affection was exhibited in bizarre as
well as in normal conduct. Because she was wealthy, she had supposed that her
money and her position entitled her to be demanding toward him - a situation
she felt she could maintain by the offer of gifts, that is to say, by bribery. This
patient had, however, surprised Dr. Eissler and "graciously assented to the
repeated explanation [that] the acceptance of gifts would lead to a detrimental
psycho-therapeutic situation"; she did not react as he had expected she would,
"with unfriendliness or hostility to the feeling of rejection which unavoidably
occurs when a gift is refused." Dr. Eissler later concluded that the relative ease
with which he resolved her impulse to bribe him may have concealed her determination to make him a beneficiary in her will. 2
Dr. Eissler did not, of course, consciously manipulate the patient toward
making her will in his favor. But, he admitted, "the patient nevertheless . . .
acted under my influence and may have been psychologically as unfree as the
person who is [as he understood it] under undue influence in terms of the law."
And this suggested two possibilities in his own state of mind - "an unconscious
10 Id. The theory of the gift is developed in some detail in id. at 126-39. Dr. Eissler believes that his personal generosity toward the patient must demonstrate "unambivalent love"
toward two general emotional objectives in the patient - a (false) feeling of personal immortality and a more vague conviction that the environment will survive even if he does not. Id. at
142-48. See generally Lifton, PsychologicalEffects of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima - The
Theme of Death, 92 DAEDALUS 462 (1963); Lifton, On Death and Death Symbolism: The
Hiroshima Disaster, PEACE IS PossmLE 14 (E. Hollins ed. 1966); S. ANTHONY, THE CHILDS
DIscovERY oF DEATH (1940).
11 K. EISSLER, supra note 1, at 145.
12 Id. at 213.
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utilization of a transference or... unconscious opportunism." In either situation,
"some wish, quote unconscious in the therapist, may nevertheless be perceived
by the patient - probably also unconsciously - and then be reacted upon by
the patient out of an intensive transference relationship." The likelihood of this
happening varies, he thinks, with the intensity of the transference.
Thus it is quite feasible that a therapist, even when motivated by
irreproachably honest conscious motives, inadvertently creates in a patient
the disposition toward giving him a gift. I do not need to construct all the
possibilities of how this may happen. The question of interest here is: how
can one ascertain that unconscious strivings colored the physician's behavior in such a way as to create a disposition of that kind in a patient?
Evidently the therapist's assertion that he did not behave in a reproachable
way is not decisive since the behavior concerns his unconscious and he
therefore must be ignorant of it, in case such a striving should become
operative. The therapist is here in a difficult situation. He is accused of
unethical conduct of which he is supposed to be unconscious; he has no
witnesses since psychotherapy does not accept the presence of a third party;
and the victim of his allegedly unethical conduct cannot be questioned because she is dead. 3
Another possibility - not present in this case - is that the psychotherapist,
given the opportunity presented by a wealthy woman who was somehow in his
power, might consciously manipulate her into making a will in his favor. There
is a third possibility, beyond the possibility that the doctor might manipulate
the patient unconsciously - a situation Dr. Eissler says he would regard as
professional incompetence. Suppose that the doctor were neither unethical nor
incompetent and that no manipulation occurred but that the patient acted out
the transference without stimulation, conscious or unconscious.
But another and even more important aspect imposes itself. This
patient undoubtedly acted under the influence of a strong transference. Since
transference per se, and a strong transference even more, is comparable
under certain circumstances to hypnotic states, the question may be raised
whether the mere acting out of the transference is tantamount to acting
under the impact of undue influence 1 4
The possibility poses a serious dilemma for those who treat mental disease and
who routinely exploit transference situations for therapeutic purposes.
Transference . . . whether interpreted or not, is the essential lever of

psychotherapy, as it is of psychoanalysis. In psychotherapy I prefer to use
transference as much as possible through the everyday channels of interpersonal communication. The whole inventory of stimuli with which one
person acts on the other stands here at the therapist's disposal. It depends
on his knowledge and skill whether, on the one hand, these stimuli are
used in such a way as to reduce the patient's anxiety or the other emotions
which block his access to reality-adjusted action, or, whether, on the other
hand, they are used to facilitate the patient's access to the sources of pleasure
and enjoyment at his disposal. The intensity of the transference which is
13 Id. at 222.
14 Id. at 224.
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necessary to accomplish these two goals varies from patient to patient. It
was evident in this patient, who had suffered for many years from a serious
disorder, that the optimum of transference was a very high one. Only if
she felt reliably protected would she dare to develop that degree of activity
which the particular circumstances of her life situation required.
The question which is of interest here concerns the extent to which a
therapist must or may make himself the protector of the patient. I believe
that in such instances as the one under discussion, when the patient had
gone through a long series of highly traumatizing disappointments, there
was scarcely an upper limit if the patient's confidence in the world and in
herself was to be restored.' 5
The dilemma is exceptionally keen in Dr. Eissler's therapy for dying patients;
they, unlike patients who may be expected to survive psychoanalysis, need not
have the transference dissolved. Their demand is for comfort and growth during
a relatively short period of time, a period expected to end with death.
During the terminal phase, of course, the necessity for maintaining a
maximum positive transference - if it still can be called transference was evident, and any consideration of the problem of the patient's dependency would have become incongruous in the exigencies of the clinical
situation. I trust it is not necessary to emphasize that these opinions concern
exclusively the technique of psychotherapy and even within this area only
exceedingly sick patients and emergency situations. To raise this question
regarding the psychoanalytic technique proper would betray a misunderstanding and lack 6of comprehension of the basic fundament and the goal
of that technique.'
Dr. Eissler recognized that his patient-testatrix had developed a very strong
transference and that she did not, therefore, "from the psychoanalytic point of
view . . . act as a free agent when she included me in her will; she was under
an undue influence .

. . .

"

Not only that, but sound medical technique, in

his opinion, presented him no alternative to putting the patient in a situation
where she was motivated to make what lawyers have for years called an "unnatural" will. This was true despite complete innocence - and even precaution
on the part of the doctor.

Transference reactions are outside the scope of the ego's will power. The
ego is victimized here by impulses which are beyond the strength of its
regulative apparatuses. The patient had evolved a very strong transference;
I was the only person in her environment whom she trusted and by whom
she felt protected, and the seeming - seeming only as we shall see later generosity of looking at me as an "object of her bounty" does not require
the assumption of any foul play on the side of the psychiatrist, but rather
it becomes explainable by considering well-known clinical facts.1 7
The alternative for the psychiatrist is an austere and self-denying attitude toward
the generosity of his patients.
15
16
17

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
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The particular and unique prominence which the transference acquires
in mental treatment in turn requires particular and unique professional
ethics for the worker in the field. Since only in mental treatment does the
handling of the transference coincide with essential professional activity,
the psychiatrist (and all the more, of course, the psychoanalyst) must take
a different attitude toward the result of the positive transference than is
necessary in any other profession. If the patient's attorney or surgeon had
helped her to the extent I had done, and she had left a legacy to either of
them, there would have been no objection to their accepting the bequest,
although positive feelings of the transference nature might have been as
much at work as they were in the patient's relationship to me. But in
surgery and law practice "positive transference" is taken for granted as an
unknown and undetermined factor for which the person who becomes the
subject of the patient's or the client's "transference" does not carry responsibility in the way in which the psychotherapist does. If surgeons and
lawyers do not intuitively handle transference correctly, they will soon be
out of business, though they may be excellent surgeons or lawyers. If a
psychotherapist or psychoanalyst does not handle transference in a therapeutically correct way, he may nevertheless increase his clientele, but he
will not cure his patients, and therefore he must be considered a poor
therapist despite the success he may have in his social group. The austerity
which the therapist must impose on the patient must be equally valid for
himself, and he cannot enjoy some of the benefits which other professions
are permitted to enjoy. Therefore, I made a mistake when I initially
thought my bequest could be used for charitable purposes. Even if this
could be done in strict anonymity, without any benefit to the therapist's
prestige, it still would have been against a self-evident and therefore unwritten basic principle. 8
The only exception to this austerity is the exception demanded by the treatment itself. "For example, in psychotherapy the refusal of a gift might end the
transference; then the acceptance of the gift is put into the therapeutic process
and has become necessitated by therapeutic requirements ....
,""
Dr. Eissler concluded, after reading a book on psychiatry and law,2" that
this situation probably does not constitute undue influence in the legal sense, but
his account suggests that he may have doubted whether this legal result is desirable. First he noted that transference, particularly in psychotherapy, may rise
to an inordinate intensity. "All the latent strivings of a positive nature, desirous
of giving and of expressing affection might become mobilized and focus upon
the therapist. The intensity of these strivings in its relationship to the strength
of the ego can be compared to a hypnotic state." Second, the patient may act
on this emotional framework without any conscious activity by the therapist and even without any unconscious activity. "[T]he patient's transference wish
still may find a symbolic and factual gratification in giving the therapist a gift.
In the situation of the dying this may easily lead to the psychiatrist's inclusion in
the will of the patient who looks at him as an object of his bounty." He concluded - but I think tentatively - that the law probably ought not regard such

18
19
20

Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 229.
M. GUTTMACHER

& H. WMHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw

(1952).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Winter, 1970]

a will as invalid, but that medicine ought, as a matter of ethics, not permit the
psychiatrist to accept the legacy.'
Dr. Eissler's experience was a product of the coincidence of the most common
of all psychotherapeutic phenomena - transference - and of an ancient
legal principle that a person subject to extraordinary influence ought to be
protected by the law from his own impulses. Dr. Eissler's problem was the result of the fact that he did not see the legal implications of a familiar and even
beneficient affective relationship with his patient. And it may be that the legal
tradition has not yet seen the psychological implications of its familiar and even
beneficent rule against undue influence. The affinities seem to be significant;
this article assumes that exploration of them will be useful to lawyers in three
ways. First, the exploration may criticize what appear to be the modem contours of the undue influence principle, particularly in wills cases. Second, in a
more positive analysis, the psychotherapeutic insights may appear to have been
foreshadowed in the legal insights, so that the process may become one of comparison - more a matter of illumination than of criticism.22 Finally, consideration of the affective relationship between helping persons and those they help the atmosphere in which Sigmund Freud first identified transference - may
be useful to lawyers in counseling their clients. A principal benefit in any exploration of law and psychology is the benefit that comes to the lawyer as a counselor
of troubled people.2"
I.

Observations on Transference from the Literature of Psychotherapy
The enormous importance that Freud attached to the transference
phenomenon became clear to me at our first personal meeting in
1907. After a conversation lasting many hours there came a pause.
Suddenly he asked me out of the blue, "And what do you think
about the transference?" I replied with the deepest conviction that
it was the alpha and omega of the analytical method, whereupon
he said, "Then you have grasped the main thing."
4
- C. G. Jung

Transference is a specialized instance of the ego defense of projection. One
way to live with myself is to blame all my troubles on other people. It is comforting to find you crabby when in fact I am crabby. Psychology regards the
maneuver as defensive; what I am defending is my conscious self, my ego, and
the ego defense in this case is projection.
21 K. EISSLER, supra note 1, at 231: "It would actually lead to an infringement upon the
patient's freedom if he could make a valid will only by excluding his psychiatrist." Dr. Eissler
concludes from this that the psychiatrist ought renounce the legacy. However, a distortion in
the testator's plan is not so easily avoided; renunciation will benefit either a residuary legatee
or intestate heirs. He also thinks his situation is peculiar to psychotherapy. Id. at 228. But he
is wrong in supposing that lawyers do not have to be governed by the same considerations. See
Magee v. State Bar of California, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962).
22 In a somewhat similar vein, see Shaffer, The PsychologicalAutopsy in Judicial Opinions
under Section 2035, 3 LOYOLA U. OF Los ANGELES L. RPv. 1 (1970).
23 See Shaffer, The "Estate Planning" Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IowA
L. Rv.376 (1970).
24 C. JUNG, Die Psychologie der Obertragung, in 16 COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. JUNG
172 (H. Read, M. Fordham & G. Adler, eds., 2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED

WORKS].
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David Riesman gives an example of projection that should be familiar to
lawyers. "Lawyers," he says, "learn not to take the law too seriously" - this
as a product of legal education in "the art of debunking legal rituals and debunking authority, especially the authority of upper-court judges." The layman
who consults a lawyer, on the other hand, consciously regards "the law" and this concept includes the people who administer law and who create it with awe, even though, unconsciously, he is cynical about the fairness and honesty
of the legal process. He is surprised and even resentful when he finds that his
lawyer takes "the law" lightly.
[he layman is not quite sure how he feels about such a person, whose
usefulness he may need and whose knowledge may fascinate him; the more
he needs him, the more he may be apt to project on to him his own tendencies to cynicism about authority and procedure 2 5
In other words, the layman resents his lawyer because his lawyer's matter-of-factness about legal authority reminds him of a cynicism and fear that he will not
admit to himself. Riesman suggests that this projection may explain why some
clients demand of their lawyers emotional support and economic identification,
even at the expense of effective advocacy 28
Displacement 7 is a kind of projection 8 in which feelings toward one person
are refocused on another person, or even on an animal or inanimate object.
For example, a patient has feelings for his doctor that were originally (and are
really) the feelings he has for his father. Displacement is also defensive, as all
projections are; by displacing his feelings a person may avoid confronting in a
realistic way his relationship toward significant people. Commentators universally
regard transference as a projection. Freudians tend to regard it as displacement
projection; Jungians tend to regard it as projection without displacement. Brussel
and Cantzlaar, who are Freudians, define transference as "unconscious displacement of libido, whereby the patient shifts his antagonism and libidinal attachments from the disturbing 'characters' in his underlying emotional conflict to
[in therapy] the psychiatrist." 29 Even Carl Rogers, who is no Freudian, sees
transference as involving "attitudes transferred to the therapist which were
originally directed, with more justification, toward a parent or other person.""0
Ernest Jones, one of the greatest of the original Freudians, defined transference in alternative ways. Sometimes, he wrote, transference is "displacement
of an affect, either positive or negative, from one person on to the psycho-analyst."
25
26

Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 30, 33 (1931).
Id at 34.

27 Displacement is a "mechanism... whereby persons, objects, situations, and ideas dis-

turbing to the ego are replaced by less offensive ones." J. BRUSSEL & G. CANTZLAAR, THE
LAY AN'S DICTIONARY ov PSYCHATRY 70 (1967).
28 Projection is "[a] defense mechanism in which the subject unconsciously attributes his
own unacceptable ideas or impulses to another." Id. at 185.
29 Id. at 226-27. The "transference situation" is
the emotional situation which develops between patient and physician; during the
course of psychoanalysis, wherein the patient transfers now affection and again hostile
feelings to the analyst which are based on transient unconscious identifications and
have no relation to reality.
M. Pncn, THE MEANING oF PsycHoANALYsis 224-25 (1950).
30 C. RoGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 198 (Houghton Mifflin ed. 1965).
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At other times transference is "displacement of affect from one idea to another." 3'
Dr. Andrew Watson's recent book for lawyers defines transference as "the unreal
attributes which the observer believes he sees or feels to be present in the observed,
and which are drawn from some superficial likeness to an important person
from the past, such as a parent." He adds that "this tendency to make a whole
from a part represents projection on the part of the observer." 2
C. G. Jung analyzed transference as projection without displacement. This
might mean that an unreal attachment to the physician represents an aspect of
the patient's character from which he must defend himself. Under Jung's theory,
as under the Freudian displacement theory, transference is a defensive operation which has its origins - or etiology" as the doctors put it - deep in the
transferring person's past, and which results in regarding the object of the transference in an unrealistic way in order that the patient may avoid necessity of
regarding himself (in Jung's theory), or some more significant person (in Freud's
theory), in a realistic way. 4
It may help to explore the transference-by-displacement idea in one of its
earliest reported clinical manifestations, Freud's patient Dora."5 Dora was an
unmarried young lady who was brought to Freud with what were then thought
to be "hysterical" physical symptoms for which her physician could find no
pathological or systemic explanation. Freud treated her for three months, in the
process discovering that she was in the midst of a romantic triangle involving her
father and a married couple (Herr and Frau K) in whose home Dora had been
31
32

E.
A.

500 (Beacon ed. 1961).
4 (1968). A. Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE LAW 144 (J. Katz, J. Goldstein & A. Dershowitz eds. 1967) referred to transference as "the most powerful instrument in
the analyst's hand" and defined it to include "all those impulses experienced by the patient
in his relationship with the analyst which are not newly created by the objective analytic situation but have their source in the early - indeed, the very earliest - object relations." Id. at
146-47. Because of this infantile origin, transference reactions are valuable "as a means of
information about the patient's past affective experiences." Id. at 147. She analyzes transference
reactions as: (a) those involving libidinal impulses ("The patient finds himself disturbed in his
relation to the analyst by passionate emotions . . . which do not seem to be justified by the
facts of the actual situation." Id.) ; and (b) transference of defense, which differs in that it is
attributable to the ego rather than to the id ("[I]n the most instructive cases [the transference
of defense is attributable] to the ego of the same infantile period in which the id impulse first
arose." Id.). The peculiar value of transference of defense is that it contains information on
the patient's ego development, "the history of the transformation through which his instincts
have passed." Id.
33 Etiology includes
[t]he facts concerning the origin and development of a patient's illness. Often used
loosely to mean "cause," the term is actually more comprehensive, embracing predisposition, environmental influences, and other phenomena directly or indirectly involved in the development of the illness. J. BRUSSEL & G. CANTZLAAR, supra note 27,
at 87.
34 S. Freud, Psychoanalysis, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE LAw, supra note
32, at 49-50. By
"transference" is meant a striking peculiarity
of neurotics. They develop
toward their physician the emotional relations, both of an affectionate and hostile
character, which are not based upon the actual situation but are derived from their
relations to their parents (the Oedipus complex). Transference is a proof of the fact
that adults have not overcome their former childish dependence; it coincides with the
force which has been named "suggestion"; and it is only by learning to make use of
it that the physician is enabled to induce the patient to overcome his internal resistances and do away with his repressions. Thus psychoanalytic treatment acts as a
second education of the adult, as a corrective to his education as a child. Id. at 50.
35 S. FREUD, DORA: AN ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF HYSTERIA 126-44 (Collier ed. 1963).
JONES, PAPERS ON PSYCHo-ANALYSIS
WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS
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an employee. Freud did not get to the bottom of all of the confusing relationships
that caused Dora's illness, but he suspected they involved homosexual attachments
to Frau K (who was her father's mistress) and a proposition from Herr K (Dora
had repulsed the proposition though she was attracted by it).
When Dora suddenly announced to Freud that she was terminating treatment, Freud did not accept her conventional explanation that she found it too
lengthy. (She had earlier agreed to treatment for a year or more; the value of
even the three months she spent with Freud is evidenced by the fact that she later
married and apparently led a relatively normal life.) Freud explained Dora's
decision in terms of her emotional identification of him with her potential lover,
Herr K. She had, Freud thought, severed her relationship with the physician
in order to punish Herr K. This was apparently one of Freud's earliest experiences with transference. He explained the phenomenon this way:
[Patients] replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To
put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the
physician at the present moment.36
Sometimes, he said, the transferences are exact reproductions of the earlier feelings
the only difference being that the object of the feelings is a new person, an
object of transference. On other occasions, the transferences are disguised, "ingeniously constructed":
-

Their content has been subjected to a moderating influence - to sublimation,37 as I call it - and they may even become conscious, by cleverly
taking advantage of some real peculiarity in the physician's person or circumstances and attaching themselves to that. These, then, will no longer
be new impressions, but revised editions.38
Freud appears to have believed that Dora's feelings for Herr K were themselves transferred from someone else, probably from her father. Dora, in other
words, had projected onto Herr K her feelings for her father (who had rejected
her in favor of a liaison with Frau K). She had then projected onto Freud her
feelings for Herr K, and had acted as she did toward Freud in order to punish
Herr K. Freud went on to express his opinion that transference feelings for
him as a doctor were almost inevitably present, and present throughout the
course of therapy, and that cure depended on their being recognized by the
patient and, through a process of awareness, dissolved. The problem in Dora s
treatment was, Freud thought, that he had not recognized the transference soon
enough; he did not treat it before Dora had an opportunity to act it out by
rejecting him.3 9
36 Id. at 138.
37 Sublimation is "[a] defense mechanism whereby consciously unacceptable instinctual
demands are channeled into acceptable forms for gratification." J. BRUSSEL & G. CANTZLAAR,
supra note 27, at 217.
38 S. FREUD, supra note 35, at 138.

39 Gill, Psychoanalysis and Exploratory Psychotherapy, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY,
AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 669-74, refers to this process as a "regressive transference
neurosis" and enumerates the "trappings of analysis" that both encourge and flow from it:
the recumbancy and inability to see the analyst... with the inevitable accompanying
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Freud explained that he could have taken an altogether different course. He
could have retained Dora as a patient by encouraging the transference. He could
have done what Dr. Eissler does with dying patients - ignoring the possibility
that transference might prevent cure. Dr. Eissler's therapeutic goal, after all, is
not cure but endurance until the patient dies. Freud elected not to encourage
the transference.
Might I perhaps have kept the girl under my treatment if I myself had
acted a part, if I had exaggerated the importance to me of her staying on,
and had shown a warm personal interest in her - a course which, even
after allowing for my position as her physician, would have been tantamount
to providing her with a substitute for the affection she longed for? I do
not know ....
[T]here must be some limits set to the extent to which psychological influence may be used, and40 I respect as one of these limits the
patient's own will and understanding.
Clearly, Freud believed he could have maintained his relationship with Dora
if he had been willing to respond to her emotion - either genuinely (a countertransference) 4 ' or falsely. Dr. Eissler responds as Freud refused to respond. His
sense of being inferior; the frustration by silence and through other techniques; the
awakening of strong needs without gratification; the absence of reality cues from the
analyst; the general atmosphere of timelessness, with the relative disregard of symptoms . . . free association, bringing into the field of consciousness the thoughts and
feelings ordinarily excluded from the usual interpersonal relationship; the emphasis
on fantasy; and . . . the frequency of visits which, metaphorically speaking, we may
regard as the constant irritation necessary to keep open the wounds into the unconscious, and indeed as a general strong invitation to become dependent, to regress,
and to feel safe enough to do so because there is time enough and stability and
frequency. Id. at 671.
For an example in which this neurosis was worked out, see F. FROMM-REICHMANN, PRINCIPLES
OF INTENSIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY 77-79 (1960). The process involved to a great extent the
experiences and emotional reactions of the physician. See id. at 91, 103-4, 106-7, 121-22.
40 S. FREUD, supra note 35, at 131.
41 Countertransference is "the analyst's emotional involvement in the patient's psychic
problem. It is due to arousal by the patient of repressed feelings in the analyst's unconscious."
J. BRuSSEL & G. CANTZLAAR, supra note 27, at 61.
42
I think there is little doubt that . . . by overt behavior toward the patient one can
more quickly get him to change some aspects of his behavior. But what is the meaning of such a change? It is an adaptation to this particular interpersonal relationship - as it exists between patient and analyst. But this is not the goal of analysis.
The goal of analysis is an intrapsychic modification in the patient, so that for example his dependent behavior is given up not because he has learned that if he acts
too dependent he will be punished . . . but because despite the invitation to regress
. . . he has come to feel and understand his dependency in such a way that he no
longer needs it or wants it - and that is a conclusion valid not simply for this particular interpersonal relationship but has more general applicability, in short has the
status of an intrapsychic change. Gill, supra note 39, at 671.
Every psychiatrist has had scores of patients who have been sick for a long time
with a nervous illness and who are miraculously cured after a few interviews with
him .... The patient is cured if he or she happens to develop a strong transference
and feels that the physician's attitude is reciprocal. This does not mean that the
physician must love him or her in the ordinary sense, but that he must be loving in
the same way that the original person of the transference - that is, the mother or
father - was loving.
The only trouble about these cures is that they last only so long as the transference lasts . . . . That is why some people are well as long as they keep running
to the doctor ....
K. MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 276 (1930).
Menninger mentions, as Freud's experience with Dora illustrates, that the transference
feelings can often be discovered only through dream analysis or through the disguised expression of feelings. See S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 106 (J.
Strachey transl. 1965).
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practice of giving gifts, of not billing for his services, and of indicating for the
patient what he refers to as "unambivalent love," is an encouragement of transference. Dr. Eissler's dying lady patients, often as a product of his skillful cultivation of their feelings, project onto him strong feelings of affection for someone
else - probably for their fathers, or brothers, or husbands - and he encourages
those feelings in order to make their dying days more psychologically comfortable.
His embarrassment in the will case reported above occurred only because he did
not foresee what must, to a lawyer, seem entirely predictable - that the patient
would make him a generous legacy and turn over to him the post-mortem management of her affairs. Because the patient is soon to die, Dr. Eissler views his
practice as defensible and even medically sound (I do not suggest the contrary).
Is it possible to imagine this same critical juncture in*human relationships occurring outside the doctor's consulting room-a juncture at which an object of
the transference is called upon to either encourage feelings or to reject them?
Might not that same human relationship explain cases of extravagant inter vivos
gifts and generous legacies in cases the courts later consider under the head of
undue influence?
Transference occurs commonly in all schools of psychotherapy and is
fundamental in Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis. The first observation
suggests the contours of transference theory as it has been developed in Freudian
psychiatry, the school of psychotherapy most directly associated with the American medical profession. It may serve the purposes of the present observation,
and some important tangential purposes, to look at the concept as it operates in
Rogerian nonmedical psychotherapy and in Jungian analytical psychology.
Gail R. Rogers, in a system for talking to troubled people which has
significance both in psychotherapy"3 and in counseling," is defensive about
transference - probably because he has been accused of exploiting it in his
relationships with, as he calls them, "clients." 45 Rogers believes that transference
in his "client-centered therapy" develops to some extent in almost all cases but
to a troublesome extent in only a few. In each situation, he sees four indications
that transference is present: (1) "a desire for dependence upon the counselor,
accompanied by deep affect"; (2) "fear of the counselor, which is . . . related
to fear of parents"; (3) "attitudes of hostility . . . beyond the attitudes
realistically related to the experience"; and (4) "expressions of affection, and
a desire for a love relationship."4
Rogers believes that the milder - and more common - transference disappears as the client is led to rely on his own judgment rather than that of his
counselor. He reports the case of a young woman who wanted to drop her
sessions with her therapist because of a dream:
I was up for trial, and you were the judge ....

I didn't see how I could come back into the situation. I mean the circum43 C. ROGERS, supra note 30, at 199-201.
44 See generally E. PORTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THERAPEuTic
L. TYLER, THE WORK OF THE COUNSELOR (3d ed. 1969).
45 0. ROGERS, supra note 30, at 199-218.
46 Id. at 200.

COUNSELING (1950);
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stances, you already judged me, and therefore I didn't really see how I
could possibly talk any more.
.

47
I suppose in my own way I was judging myself.

In the process of talking the dream out, Rogers believes, this lady came to
see that she was projecting a self-assessment and was capable of recognizing
"that there are other sensory evidences which I have not admitted into consciousness, or have admitted but interpreted inaccurately." When this happens:
the "transference attitudes" . . . simply disappear because experience has

been reperceived in a way which makes them meaningless. It is analogous
to the way in which one attitude drops out and another entirely different
one takes its place when I turn to watch the large plane I have dimly
glimpsed out of the corner of my eye, and find it to be a gnat flying by a
few inches from my face.4
In other cases, those involving "aggressive dependence" and those in which
the patient "insists that the counselor must take over," Rogers feels that his system of "client-centered therapy" is relatively unsuccessful. He gives an example
that also illustrates the intensity of some transference reactions. Another young
lady has developed a strong negative transference toward her therapist; she is
ravaged by guilt feelings that relate to possible incest with her father:
I want to be independent -

but I want to show you I don't have to be

dependent. ... You feel I want to come, but I don't! I'm not coming anymore. It doesn't do any good. I don't like you. I hate you! . . . All I've
had is pain, pain, pain .... You think I can't get well, but I can. You
think I had hallucinations, but I didn't. I hate you. . . . You think I'm

crazy, but I'm not.4 9

Rogers believes that psychoanalysis develops transference more strongly
than his system of psychotherapy does. The truth or falsity of this assertion is
not of importance here, but the substance of Rogers's explanation for his position is directly relevant to the lives we lawyers have with our clients; for that
reason it might be useful to consider it briefly.
Rogers explains transference in terms of dependence. First, he says, evaluation by an authoritative person tends to create dependence - evaluation of
a moral character ("It is perfectly normal to .... "), or evaluation of characteristics (as in psychological testing, or I suppose, an assessment of chances for
success in litigation), or evaluation of causes or patterns in the client's life.
Second, "dependency arises when it is expected," something which follows from
"the analyst's stress upon the use of free association," and other devices in which
"the patient is advised to avoid all feeling of responsibility," which in turn
"would tend to imply that another will be responsible for him."5 (One might
pause to ask if there is a resemblance between this assessment of analysis and
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

202.
210.
211-12.
214-15.
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the assessment Rogers might make of lawyers who tell clients, "Don't worry

about a thing; I'll take care of it") In summary:
When the client is evaluated to realize clearly in his own experience that
this evaluation is more accurate than any he has made himself, then selfconfidence crumbles, and a dependent relationship is built up. When the
therapist is experienced as "knowing more about me than I know myself,"
then there appears to the client to be nothing to do but to hand over the
reins of his life ....51

The example he gives, of a patient who became dependent on his doctor for
every sort of practical, day-to-day advice, resembles examples given by FrommReichmann s2 as well as experiences most practicing lawyers could relate on the
subject of client dependence.
Jung's treatment of transference" is at the center of his view of man, and
illustrates his use of the concept of collective unconscious to explain behavior.
Jung regarded transference as a natural phenomenon rather than a manipulative
device. While he admitted that the phenomenon was common, he thought
psychotherapy would probably be better off without it. When it occurs, it poses
a delicate and even insurmountable obstacle to the doctor:
What seems to be so easily won by the transference always turns out in the
end to be a loss; for a patient who gets rid of a symptom by transferring it
to the analyst always makes the analyst the guarantor of this miracle and

so binds himself to him more closely than ever.5 4

This diffidence seems to be fundamentally at odds with Freud, who said that
"the field of application of analytic therapy lies in the transference neurosis,"
and even suggested that any mental disorders "differing from these, narcissistic
and psychotic conditions, is unsuitable to a greater or less extent" for psychoanalysis. 5 This leads the Freudian and his patient to work for transference, a
venture Jung believed to be futile. "[T]iansference is only another word for
51 Id. at 215-16.
52 Two comments should be made on this assessment of psychoanalysis. First, Rogers does
not discuss the use of transference to discover etiology - to find out about the patient's past
experiences. See A. Freud, supra note 32, passim. Second, he does not emphasize (at least
not as much as the psychiatrists who write on transference) the important effects of dissolution of the transference as a last step in treatment. See F. FROMM-ItXICHMANN, supra note 39,
passim; M. PEEc, supra note 29, at 92-100. The early stage of transference is positive in that
it leads to discussion of "trains of thought ordinarily automatically repressed," and leads the
patient to feel that "he may not be so different from other people ... he feels hope, and his
attitude ... is that at last he has found ... someone to understand him." Id. at 94-95. It is

difficult but essential that this attitude be ultimately made realistic. "The analysis is not complete... until he has given up the analyst as an object of very special significance in his own
emotional life." Id. at 99-100. Peck sees a technique of dissolution as important to avoid "the
difficulty of a permanent transference bondage." Id. at 171-72. He suggests that one problem
with nonmedical psychotherapy is that it may develop and depend on a permanent transference.
Id. at 94. Peck, ironically, ends up accusing "client-centered therapy" of the same sins Rogers
finds in psychoanalysis.
53 Jung regarded transference as "the main problem of medical psychotherapy." C. JUNG,
MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS 212-13 (R. & C. Winston trans]. 1963). Jung first worked
this theory out in his 1946 book, Die Psychologie der Ubertragung.16 COLLECTED.WORICS 172.
See C. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE, THE TAvISTOcK LECTURES (1968).
54 16 COLLECTED WORKS 328. See also id. at 133-34.
55 S.FREUD, supra note 42, at 155.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Winter, 1970]

'projection.' No one can voluntarily make projections, they just happen. They
are illusions which merely make the treatment more difficult.""8 When transference does occur it is delicate, time consuming, and not so methodically broken
as the Freudians implied. "Words like 'nonsense' only succeed in banishing
little things - not the things that thrust themselves tyrannically upon you in the
stillness and loneliness of the night."5
Psychotherapentic relations rest, in Jung's view, on rapport - and he apparently did not regard therapeutic rapport as coextensive with transference,
although his discussion suggests that transference is often present along with
rapport." Transference, when it occurs, is a projection; and projections are dissociative - they are unintegrated bits of the personality wrongly seen as belonging outside the self. 9 The cure for them is integration - individuation - and
this involves two or three features that are noteworthy for present purposes.
First, honest rapport minimizes transference:
The transference is the patient's attempt to get into psychological rapport
with the doctor. He needs this relationship if he is to overcome the dissociation. The feebler the rapport . . .the more intensely
will the trans60
ference be fostered and the more sexual will be its form.
A concomitant feature of transference, according to Jung, is that it seems
to answer an affective hunger that is often present in disturbed people;
their mental weakness "is enough to set these instinctive urges and desires in
motion and bring about a dissociation of personality."'" This accounts, at least
in part, for the sexual element in transference. Another feature - and one that
seems to bear potently on cases like Dr. Eissler's - is that the doctor's personality is unavoidably involved in the transference. "Mwo psychic systems interact . . . individuality is a fact not to be ignored, the relationship must be
dialectical." 62 The very survival of the patient may depend on "the doctor's
knowledge, like a flickering lamp . . . the one dim light in the darkness."6 5
The doctor has an opportunity to lead his patient to the integration of personality - "[n]o longer a mere selection of suitable fictions, but a string of
56 16 COLLECTED WORKS 328. See also C. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 53,
at 170.
57

16 COLLECTED WORKS 255.

58

Id. at 3-9.

59

[Ihe essential factor is the dissociation of the psyche and not the existence of a

highly charged affect and, consequently . . . the main therapeutic problem is not
abreaction but how to integrate the dissociation. This argument advances our discussion and entirely agrees with our experience that a traumatic complex brings about
dissociation of the psyche. The complex is not under the control of the will and for
this reason it possesses the quality of psychic autonomy. Id, at 131.

60
61
62

Id. at 134.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 9.

63

Id.

at 199.
So long as the patient can think that somebody else (his father or mother) is respon-

sible for his difficulties, he can save some semblance of unity . . . . But once he
realizes that he himself has a shadow, that his enemy is in his own heart, then the
conflict begins and one becomes two. Since the "other" will eventually prove to be
yet another duality, a compound of opposites, the ego soon becomes a shuttlecock
tossed between a multitude of "velleities," with the result that there is an "obfuscation of the light," i.e., consciousness is depotentiated and the patient is at a loss to

know where his personality begins or ends. Id. at 198.
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hard facts, which together make up the cross we all have to carry or the fate
we ourselves are."64 But Jung is at some pains to make it clear that this therapeutic process is not a matter of manipulation. The transference relationship is
most of all a link between the unconscious of the doctor and that of the patient; 5 Jung believes they share in a collective unconscious.6 Without going
so far, though, one can appreciate the relevance of his insight to any legal
analysis of the confidential relationship a litigant in Dr. Eissler's position may
have had with his patient:
The transference . . . alters the psychological stature of the doctor,
though this is at first imperceptible to him. He too becomes affected, and
has as much difficulty in distinguishing between the
patient and what has
67
taken possession of him as has the patient himself.
A final important insight of Jung's is that the sexual element in transference is archetypal rather than oedipal. Both Freud and Jung had to take
account of the sexual element. Freud linked it to the infantile Oedipus complex,
the child's desire to replace his father in his mother's life. Transference to a
female therapist by a male patient would therefore involve these sexual feelings,
though not all modem Freudians would agree.6" Jung thought that the projection was fundamentally of the contrasexual element within the patient himself.
A man tends to project the female within him - the anima. In childhood he
has made this projection on his mother and sisters; he later projects it on other
women, but it often retains a certain incestuous character.6 (He also projects
homo-erotic feelings from within himself on his father, his brothers, his male
doctor.) 7" This anima projection in its purest form involves the incest taboo;71
but it affords also the therapeutic opportunity for a "spiritual marriage" in
which the projected and unprojected elements of the patient's personality are
integrated into a new conscious self."2 This process, insofar as it is therapeutic,"
is a process which needs some substitute for the biological unity of the family "family" here in the. sense of ancient, archetypal, "kinship" as well as in an
etiological sense. The idea that integration takes place in a human association
that is libidinal but not sexual is complex-almost mystical-but it is obviously
central to what Jung says about transference in modem man:
Everyone is now a stranger among strangers. Kinship libido ..
has long
been deprived of its object. But, being an instinct, it is not to be satisfied
64 Id. at 199.
65 Id. at 176-82.
66

67

Id. at 183-85.

Id. at 182. Jung's conception of the transference is that it is a third force, which pos-

sesses both the patient and the analyst. See id. at 171-73, 175-80.

68
69

See, e.g., F. FROmm-REICMANN, supra note 39, at 2, 99.
16 COLLECTED WORXS 95-96. "Whenever this drive for wholeness appears, it begins by

disguising itself under the symbolism of incest, for, unless he seeks it in himself, a man's nearest
feminine counterpart is to be found in his mother, sister, or daughter." Id. at 263.
70 Id. at 178-82, 218.
71 Id. at 219-32.
72 Id. at 232-33.

73 Jung goes beyond the therapeutic - he describes the process as virtually political. Id.
at 233.
74 Id. at 265-66. This is related to Jung's seminal thinking about the second half of life.
See C. JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL 95-115 (W. Dell & C. Baynes transl. 1933).
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by any mere substitute such as a creed, party, nation, or state. It wants the
human connection. That is the core of the whole transference phenomenon, and it is impossible to argue it away, because relationship to the
self is at once relationship to our fellow75man, and no one can be related
to the latter until he is related to himself.
Transference is not limited to psychotherapeutic relationships. It may occur
in any relationship in which the transferring person feels trust toward the
object of the transference. In his recent book, Psychiatry for Lawyers, Dr.
Andrew S. Watson suggests that transference is an essential "tool" in the relationship between lawyer and client."' Transference is, he says, an "ubiquitous
phenomenon"; lawyers who bother to understand the phenomenon "can profit
immensely." He quotes former Justice Abe Fortas and Talcott Parsons in support of the proposition that transference and countertransference are commonplace in the law office. He directs most of his brief discussion of the subject
toward legal counseling, but not without noticing in the process that a father-son
transference relationship often develops between young lawyers and their senior
partners."' "The capacity to accept the possibility that one's feelings about
another may be due to unconscious and unrealistic coloring rather than to the
other's reality traits," he says, "is a major step toward understanding" in relations among lawyers and in lawyer-client encounters. "Without awareness of
transference phenomena, people are over- or under-convinced by their own
emotional responses and have no opportunity to work out any understanding of
them.""8

Dr. Watson applies, close to home, the insight that transference is a
matter of everyday living. The point is rare and important. Personal observation by physicians gives them little opportunity to work out principles of "relatedness" in nonmedical contexts, but the relatedness is present everywhere.
"[E]arly experiences in interpersonal relatedness," Fromm-Reichmann said,
"affect . . . later relationships with [a] family doctor, dentist, minister, etc.
Even the mere anticipation of consulting any kind of qualified helper ... may
pave the way for the development of transference reactions." She added that
"[a]s a result, present-day persons and interpersonal situations will be misjudged,
incorrectly evaluated, and paratactically distorted along the lines of the patients'
unrevised, early, dissociated experiences. '79 "The transference itself," Jung said,
"is a perfectly natural phenomenon which does not by any means happen only
in the consulting room - it can be seen everywhere and may lead to all sorts
75 16
76 A.
77 Id.
and Jung,
78 A.

COLLECTED WORs 233-34.
WATSON, PsYCHIATAY FOR LAWYERS 4-9 (1968).
at 6-7. See the discussion of this point as to the personal relationship between Freud
note 94 infra.
WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 8 (1968).

So, if a patient projects the saviour complex into you, for instance, you have to give
back to him nothing less than a saviour ....

. .fEach profession carries its respective difficulties, and the danger of analysis
is that of becoming infected by transference projections . . . . So he begins to feel,
"If there are saviours, well, perhaps it is just possible that I am one," and he will
fall for it, at first hesitantly, and then it will become more and more plain to him
that he really is a sort of extraordinary individual. 0. JuNO, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 53, at 171. That sort of thing, of course, never happens to lawyers.
79

F. FROMM-RmcHMAIN, supra note 39, at 97-98.
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of nonsense . ... -1o Dr. Peck suggested that transference is likely to exist in

any professional relationship in which good rapport has been established;8 1
one psychiatrist even attempted to gauge transference between students and their
teacher in an engineering class. 2
Transference often crosses sexual lines and may involve a reversal of
generations. Jung used a medieval book on alchemy to explain transference.
He built his explanation around woodcuts that illustrated the coniunctio between
symbolic, mythical male and female figures.8 3 His theory was that transference
involves the projection of contrasexual contents in the unconscious of the transferring person. Although he did not confine transference to this sort of projection - it was possible, he said, to transfer even onto inanimate objects84 it is clear that the Jungian prototype of transference is contrasexual. Freud's
view of transference was tied to his view of the Oedipus complex. Feelings transferred by the patient originated in competition between the patient and his
father for the love of the patient's mother - a necessarily contrasexual relationship 5 It is possible to exaggerate the importance of the sexual element in
transference - especially in a limited discussion, for nonmedical purposes.
Fromm-Reichmann appears to disagree with Freud's view on the Oedipus complex in transference; she regards the affective content in the transference as a
"wish for closeness and tenderness with the beloved parent... without recognizable sexual roots," and attributes the apparently contrasexual character of transference to the fact that people in our culture find it easier to talk about sex
than about "friendly, tender, asexually loving aspects of ... interpersonal relationships.""8 However, the evidence for some contrasexual tendency in transference is at least strong enough to justify seeking a parallel between clinical
experience with the phenomenon and the apparent incidence of contrasexual
transference in undue influence wills cases s7
80

COLLECTED WoRKs 218.
All activated contents of the unconscious have the tendency to appear in projections.
It is even the rule that an unconscious content which is constellated shows itself
first as a projection. Any activated archetype can appear in projection, either into an
external situation, or into people, or into circumstances - in short, into all sorts of
objects. There are even transferences to animals and to things. C. JUNG, ANALYTICAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 53, at 158.
81 M. PECK, supra note 29, at 93-94.
82 Kahne, Psychiatrist Observer in the Classroom, MED. TI.AL TEcH. Q., June 1969,
at 81.

83

84

85

16

16 COLLECTED WoRKs 247-56.

C.

JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note

S.FREUD, supra note 42, at 106.

53, at 158.

They have their source in old affective constellations, such as the Oedipus and the
castration complex, and they become comprehensible and indeed are justified if we
disengage them from the analytic situation and insert them into some infantile affective
situation. A. Freud, supra note 32, at 147. See Joseph, supra note 8; K. MENNINGER, supra note 42; 16 COLLECTED WORKS 95-96; text accompanying note 69, supra. See

also E.JONES, supra note 31, at 413-95.

86 F.
87

FROMM-REICHaANN,

supra note

39, at 99.

Patrick E. Maloney, a third-year law student, undertook to check this impression and

an impression on generation reversal against the appellate literature. He took random samples
from all of the cases indexed under "undue influence" in the Indiana digest and the California
digest. Based on a study of fourteen randomly selected Indiana cases and forty-three randomly
selected California cases, he obtained the following results. In Indiana, sixty-four percent of
the cases involved contrasexual relationships and eighty-six percent involved what I have called
generation reversal. In California, seventy-seven percent of the cases involved contrasexual
relationships and sixty-three percent involved generation reversal. These figures indicate a

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Winter, 1970]

A more evasive aspect of transference is that it frequently appears to involve
generation reversal. Ernest Jones, an early giant of psychiatry, noted that children tend, almost universally, to believe that people grow smaller as they grow

older. "When I am a big girl and you are a little girl," a child says to her
mother, "I shall whip you just as you whip me now." The fantasy extends, as
in this example, to a general reversal of parent-child positions; Jones finds
parallels in certain Eastern and Egyptian myths and even in Little Red Riding
Hood. He attributes this phenomenon to an early, narcissistic conviction of
immortality, to early impulses of love and hate for parents, and to a childish
need to find, in fantasy, a position in which the child can both demand from
and help his parents. The phenomenon has a number of important results, most
notably in a parent's compulsion to compare his own child with his parent.
"I have . . . noticed," Jones says, "how the parent's attitude towards quite
minute specific traits ... in his or her own parent is reproduced when dealing
with his or her child." This has a significant cultural effect in the transfer of
traditions, traditions which may be defied, as well as accepted, by the child on
whom they are imposed."8

This piece of clinical observation is relevant here because it may help to
explain the fact that transference often appears to involve an object - contrasexual or not - who is younger than the patient or client making the transference. This was apparently true in Dr. Eissler's case. It was often true in
Jung's practice and may account in part for his conviction that the process of
individuation, toward which the transference tends, occurs in the second half
of life.89
It may be that use of Jones's explanation is overly complex, and that the
transference onto younger people is merely a species of regression." Regression

significant level of transfers to younger people thought by plaintiffs or their counsel to justify
an undue-influence contest. They further indicate that the level of contrasexual transfers was
higher in both states than would occur by accident (assuming that chance occurrence would
be approximately fifty percent).
In terms of what courts do with these situations, the study indicates that in California
twenty-nine percent of all cases resulted in appellate holdings against the will; thirty-seven
percent of all cases involving contrasexual relationships resulted in appellate holdings against
the will; and twenty-six percent of all cases involving generation reversal resulted in appellate
holdings against the will.
In Indiana, thirty percent of all appellate holdings were against the will; thirty-six percent
of appellate holdings in contrasexual relationship cases were against the will; and thirty-one
percent of all appellate holdings in generation reversal cases were against the will.
From all this I conclude that:
(1) A contrasexual will transfer is more likely to be subject to contest than a transfer
where testator and legatee are of the same sex. And, when the suit is brought, it is more likely
to be successful where the transfer is contrasexual than where it is not.
(2) A transfer which is cross-generational tempts contest in a great many cases (as much
as four-fifths of all cases brought). But, when the suit is brought, the chances of winning or
losing are about the same as if no generation reversal were involved. The first part of this
second conclusion is not very useful, since there is no "normal" transfer situation with which it
may be compared. One would expect that most testamentary transfers would go from older to
younger persons.
88 E. JONES, supra note 31, at 411-12.
89 C. JUNG, supra note 74.
90 Regression is a "[r]eversal of psychosexual development; a primary feature of schizophrenia. .. " The patient in extreme cases "retraces his steps back to the protective shell of
security of babyhood and there, beyond the reach of society's demands, constructs his own
thoroughly satisfying world of fantasy . .. ." J. BRusSEL & G. CANTZLAAR, supra note 27,
at 200. In his Analytical Psychology, Jung notes that some ancient and medieval sexual
practices were designed to prevent spouses from regressing all the way to attachment to parents.

[Vol. 45: 197]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TRANSFERENCE

was sufficient to explain the transference noted by Bloch, Silber and Perry;
they found that parents in'the 1956 Vicksburg tornado disaster turned to their
children for emotional support.9 Burton noted that an elderly, dying lady in a
hospital tended to regress to a need for the sort of love she had as a child. 2
However this contragenerational element in transference is explained, it is important to suggest some clinical parallel, here because many undue influence
wills cases involve testators influenced by younger, trusted legatees.
Transference relationships may become exceptionally strong. Dr. Eissler's
assessment was that transference can be virtually hypnotic. Examples from
Freud and Jung may illustrate the point. Freud's case involved a Herr P who
had developed a strong positive transference for Freud. Freud had decided he
could not help Herr P and had told him so, but Herr P wanted to continue
therapy for some few weeks until his duties at a university began. Freud agreed,
although he recognized that his only link to the patient was that Herr P "felt
comfortable in a well-tempered father-transference to me," and that this indefinite arrangement was "in disregard of the strict rules of medical practice."
The relationship became so intense that the patient seemed to know facts most notably the name of a foreign visitor to Freud's office - which were,
objectively, hidden from him. Freud was tempted 'to believe that the relationship between him and Herr P caused a transfer of thought."
Jung's examples are even more candid; one of them involved Freud, with
whom he had a strong father-son relationship, which Freud also experienced. 9 While they were still speaking to each other, Jing had 'a dream that
signaled to him their forthcoming break and that represented both aspects of
the ambivalent transference relationship:
[HIe still meant to me a superior personality, upon whom I had projected
the father, and at the time of the dream this projection was still far from
eliminated. Where such a projection occurs, we are no longer objective;
we persist in a state of divided judgment. On the one hand we are dependent, and 'on the other we have resistances. When the dream took
place I still thought highly of Freud, but at the same time I was critical
of him. This divided attitude is a sign that I was still unconscious of the
situation and had not come 'to any resolution of it. This is characteristic of
all projections.95
Jung cited his other example 'in explanation of parapsychological phenoTheory was that the spouse would regress to interim feelings toward a temple prostitute or a
feudal lord (prima nox). C. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 53, at 178.
91 'Bloch, Silber & Perry, Some Factors in the Emotional Reaction of Children to Disaster,
113 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 416 (1956); see Shaffer, The "Estate Planning" Counselor and
Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IowA L. Rv. 376 (1970).
92 Burton, Death as Countertransference, 49 PSYCHOANALYSIS & PSYCHOANALYTIC REV.
3 (1962).
93 S. FREUD, supra note 42, at 47-54.
94 Time reports the discovery of correspondence between Freud and G. Stanley Hall in
which Hall wrote to Freud that the split between Freud and Jung was a classical case of
adolescent rebellion. Freud replied:
"If the real facts were more familiar to you, you would very likely not have thought
that there was again a case where a father did not let his sons develop, but you
would have seen that the sons wished to eliminate their father, as in ancient times."
TIME, Sept. 5, 1969, at 32.
95 C. JUNo, MEMoRIEs, DREAmS, REFLECTIONS 163-64 (R. & C. Winston transl. 1963).
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mena. A patient, with whom Jung had formed a strong transference, was
progressing toward cure when he discovered that his wife resented Jung. In
the face of stress between wife and surrogate father, the patient relapsed into
depression. One night Jung was awakened as if someone were in his room.
While awake he felt a dull pain at the back of his skull. The next day he
learned that his patient had shot himself in the head, at the time of Jung's experience. "The collective unconscious is common to all," Jung said of this
experience. "[I]t is the foundation of what the ancients called the 'empathy
of all things.' In this case the unconscious had knowledge of my patient's
condition.""8
III. The Transference Relationship in Undue Influence Cases
. . recollecting, that, in discussing whether it is an act of rational
consideration, an act of pure volition, uninfluenced, that inquiry
is so easily baffled in a Court of justice, that instead of the spontaneous act of a friend, uninfluenced, it may be the impulse of a
mind misled by undue kindness, or forced by oppression ....
And,
therefore, if the Court does not watch these transactions, with a
jealousy almost invincible, in a great majority of cases it will lend
its assistance to fraud ....
-Lord Eldon"'
Dr. Eissler's discussion of transference, coupled with reasonable conjecture
from other clinical discussions, suggests four situations in which the subject of
the transference might make gratuitous disposition of property in favor of the
object of the transference - situations to which the law of undue influence
has been applied.
First, the object of the transference consciously manipulates it to his own
advantage. Second, the object of the transference is (a) aware of his power
over the subject, (b) aware of the transfer, or plans for the transfer, in his
favor, and (c) disinclined to do anything about.the effect of the transference,
which favors him. In this second situation, conscious manipulation of the
transference cannot be shown. Third, the object of the transference is not aware
of any of the facts noted in the second case, but unconsciously manipulates the
person in his power ("unconscious opportunism," in Dr. Eissler's phrase).
Fourth, there is no evidence of manipulation, conscious or unconscious, but there
is evidence that a transference existed, and the evidence supports a conclusion
that the gratuitous transfer was a result of the transference - ie., it was an
inappropriate gift, which the law terms "unnatural."' S Each of these four examples can be found in the appellate and secondary literature on undue influence.
A. Conscious Manipulation
In re Kauffmann's Will9 made two trips to the appellate division of the New
96 Id. at 138.
97 Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. Jr. 292, 297, 32 Eng. Rep. 615, 617 (Ch. 1804).
98 See 3 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 29.124, at 669 (1961).

99 20 App. Div. 2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 825, 205 N.E.2d 864,
257 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1965).
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York Supreme Court and was finally resolved, by a divided court, against
legacies made by Robert Kaufmann to his friend Walter Weiss. The majority
held that the evidence supported a jury finding that the will had been obtained
by undue influence. The relationship between Kaufmann and Weiss spanned
eleven years. Kaufmann was a middle-aged bachelor, a millionaire, an amateur
painter, and an inept businessman who had inherited all of his wealth; Weiss
was a lawyer not in practice, a domineering personality, and a loyal companion
to his well-heeled friend. The contestants were Robert's brothers and nephews.
Both opinions in the appellate division are fervent; the majority seemed to
absorb the emotional force of the contestants' argument and represented Weiss's
conduct in such righteous hyperbole as "deceitful," "improper, and insidious,"
"deliberately false," and "unnatural ... influence"; the brothers and nephews
were subjects of such cordial phrases as "natural warm family" and "intimately
and warmly associated." The dissenters saw the family as "disappointed relatives," noted "business differences" between Kaufmann and his brother, and
said Kaufmann "rarely saw his relatives" even before he came to know Weiss.
The majority opinion speaks of Kaufmann himself as weak and submissive; the
dissenters describe him as sensitive, intelligent, and merely peculiar.
Kaufmann and Weiss met in 1948 and entered into a business arrangement
under which Weiss was to be Kaufmann's financial advisor. Within two years
they were sharing Kaufmanr's apparently palatial New York townhouse. Five
wills were at issue. The first, which gave, his property to brothers, nephews,
friends and charities - and a small legacy to Weiss - was seen by the majority
as a "natural testamentary disposition." The other four, dating from 1951 to
1958, progressively increased Weiss's share and ultimately eliminated all other
legatees except the two nephews; these were characterized as the result of a
calculated scheme:
To overtly seize Robert's property would risk a challenge by his family.
So long as Robert was under his control and influence, Weiss was assured
of a life of ease and luxury. He, therefore, need only direct Robert toward
making him his principal beneficiary in the event of his death. This he
could do without the knowledge of the family. The result was to be substantiated by written declarations of Robert assigning reasons for the unnatural disposition.10"
This last sentence referred to Robert's handwritten letter, put with the first
of the contested wills (executed in 1951); the letter explained to the family
that Weiss had encouraged Robert's painting, had given him "a balanced,
healthy sex life," and had been responsible for his peace of mind. The majority
explained the letter with alternative theories - either it was dictated by Weiss,
or it was so filled with errors as to indicate Robert's weakness of mind.' 1'

100 Id. at 482, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
101 Id. at 471, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 672. "The emotional base reflected in the letter . . . is
gratitude utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to a state of fervor and ecstasy." Id.
at 474, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 674. The court suggests that Weiss had a hand in writing it. Id. at
481-83, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 681-82.
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The majority's view of the relationship was that it began in dependence,
largely because Robert "sought help and direction to satisfy his drive for independence." Robert immediately made a bad bargain ($10,000 a year for
Weiss's advice). He then began to take Weiss's advice in business and lost large
amounts of money because Weiss was a bad advisor. Weiss then, in the majority
view, began to use business quarrels within the family as a pretext for alienating
Robert from his brothers; "Weiss exploited Robert, induced him to transfer to
him the stewardship fonnerly exercised by [his brother, and] increased Robert's
need for dependency, prevented and curtailed associations which threatened his
absolute control of Robert and alienated him from his family.""'
Once family control was eliminated, in the majority's view, Weiss intensified his own virtually parental control over Kaufmann. They travelled together
(at Kaufmann's expense); Weiss wrote notes to Kaufmann that were sometimes
curt and commanding, sometimes condescending. ("I think you are finally
growing up and realize you are not playing with marbles.")"I Weiss dominated
the household while Kaufmann "stood by mutely . . . submitted silently . . .
complied."' ° Once control was undisputed, Weiss built the system of gratuitous
transfers at issue - legacies of corporate stock, of cash, of real estate; beneficiary
designations on life insurance; and cash gifts."0 5
The majority believed that throughout this carefully constructed relationship
Weiss practiced calculated, pervasive deception on Robert and his brothers and
manipulated Robert's affections. The court called this eleven-year adventure a
"skillfully executed plan," and carefully implied that Weiss exploited a homosexual relationship with Robert.' 6 Robert was, the majority said, "a personality
with pathological dependency; one unable to deal with reality, insecure, unstable
and who tends to submit unreasonably to the will of another."'0 7 This was a
case of the "insidious, subtle and impalpable kind which subverts the intent
or will of the testator, internalizes within the mind of the testator the desire to
do that which is not his intent but the intent and end of another." s
The dissenters thought the evidence was circumstantial and unconvincing;
102 Id. at 479, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 679. The majority also felt that Weiss attempted without
success to win the support of Robert's brothers. Id. at 467, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
103 Id. at 468, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
104 Id. at 480, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
105 These transfers were summarized by the dissenters. Id. at 488, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
The majority regarded the inter vivos transfers as circumstantial evidence of undue influence
in the execution of the will. Id. at 468-69, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70.
106 The majority, in referring to Kaufmann's ambiguous allusion to Weiss's effect on his
sex life, saw an "implication .. . that Weiss in some fashion was identified with Robert's sex
life," but noted Weiss's denial of such involvement. Id. at 471, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 672. The
dissenters spoke of "love and affection" and "the intimate relationship which existed between
the two men" but insisted that "the morals of these men" were irrelevant. Id. at 490-91, 247
N.Y.S.2d at 689-90. The dissenters later admitted, rather more bluntly, that "the relationship
may be likened to that of one who has a mistress." Id. at 492, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
107 Id. at 482, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 682 (paraphrasing medical testimony from the record).
The majority saw the manipulation as a shift in affection from Robert's brothers to Weiss, id.
at 469, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 670, rather than as a creation of affection ab initio. That is, of course,
similar to Freud's description of his experience with Dora.
108 Id. at 482-83, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 682. This was, the majority said, not overcome by "[t]he
fact that the instrument.., was prepared by reputable, competent attorneys. .... " Id. at 485,
247 N.Y.S.2d at 684. It is clear - although the point is well hidden - that the holding does
not rest upon a presumption of undue influence, but upon a finding that the evidence supported the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 485-86, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685-86.
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the verdict, they said, rested "upon surmise, suspicion, conjecture and moral
indignition and resentment, not upon the legally required proof of undue influence ... . ""' The two dissenting judges felt that Weiss was being tried for
admitted discrepancies between pretrial testimony and facts in the record, and
for the peculiar "intimate relationship," which neither set of judges was able
to be candid about."' The dissenting view of the four wills at issue was that
they were the result of close friendship and gratitude. The dissenters could not
accept the notion that undue influence could be exercised progressively and
consistently for eleven years: "It is not claimed that the testator was hypnotized
by Weiss during all this period, and certainly no evidence thereof has been
presented.""'
Both sets of judges, for all their hyperbole, agreed on the existence of a
confidential relationship. Dicta in the majority opinion puts the case within
New York precedents that place the burden of proof on the proponent when
it is shown there is "a marked departure from a prior, natural plan of testamentary
disposition which excessively and unnaturally favors a nonrelative under circumstances establishing motive, opportunity, overreaching and persistent involvement in transfers and dispositions of property .... 11 2 The dissenters admitted the
influence, and even deplored it, but felt the majority encroached too far on
freedom of testation. "Undoubtedly the testator was influenced but the evidence... is entirely consistent with the complete lack of undue influence," the
dissenters said. "Yet, because of the suspicious circumstances involved, the
majority.., would deny him his legal right to dispose of his property as he has
chosen to do.""'
Kauffmann appears to be a clear case of manipulation. Evidentiary sophistication in dealing with it - most notably the sophistication of a presumption
or shift in the burden of proof - is not necessary to the decision. The majority
alluded to the New York rule on presumption of undue influence, but its holding does not rest on a presumption or on an esoteric view of burden of proof;
the case was decided solely on the record. Psychological sophistication is not
necessary either, given the majority's view of the evidence. A transference
dearly existed, and it was clearly contrasexual, even though both parties were
male. It was a strong transference, an emotional lever Weiss could have exploited in all the ways the family pointed out. It probably gripped Weiss, too,
but the majority could not discuss that because it was too intent on finding a
villain. Moral judgments about Weiss and his power over Robert Kaufmann
were doubtless made by the jury. They were made expressly by appellate judges
on both sides of the issue; they were made by the majority in such a way as
to resolve the evidence into both a finding and a righteous condemnation.
Transference theory illuminates this sort of case; it would temper judicial
Y
109 Id. at 490, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
110 "Of course, the court does not condone the relationship, but the moral law may not be
substituted for the law of wills; and it should not be overlooked that difficult cases tend to
make bad law." Id. at 492, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
111 Id., 247 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
112 Id. at 486, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685. See 1 W. Bows. & D. PARKER, PAo ON WILLS § 15.4
(1960); 3 W. Bows & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS §§ 29.124, 29.131, at 669, 685 (1961); 1
R. JENNINGS, JARMAN ON WILLS 28-29 (8th ed. 1951).
113 20 App. Div. 2d 464, 492, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 691 (1964).- '

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Winter, 1970]

rhetoric to have the theory out in the open - if only because the judges would
see that we all manipulate and are manipulated - but it would probably not
change the decision.
B. The "Let It Happen" Case
Transference may work its way without overt manipulation; the sagacious
potential legatee simply lets matters take their course. This is the second category
of undue influence case suggested by Dr. Eissler's experience. The object of the
transference is aware that he has power over the subject; he is aware (or should
be) that the subject plans some more or less inappropriate memorial of the
relationship; and he does nothing about it. Dr. Eissler thought that psychotherapist who allows this to happen is unethical, while the psychotherapist who
doesn't know it is happening is incompetent.
This case is harder to resolve than the overt manipulation case because the
object of the transference let the testator's emotions do his work for him. What
Jung saw as virtually a third personality - the shared unconscious of both
parties - is at work. Even if Jung's analysis seems unduly mystical, it at least
provides a useful metaphor. The unconscious interaction is like a third person:
neither party controls it, but the testator is controlled by it.
In re Faulks' Will. 14 is an example. Mrs. Mary Faulks was the testator;
the litigation was between a will offered by her quasi-adopted son Will Jensen
and a later will offered by her physician, Dr. L. G. Patterson. All the relevant
facts occurred during the last two years of Mrs. Faulks's six-year widowhood,
while she was between the ages of 76 and 78 and Dr. Patterson was between 36
and 38. Her earlier wills (not at issue) had given her estate largely to Will
Jensen. She and her husband had raised Will, saw him married to a neighbor's daughter, and then made the young couple their successors on the family
farm. Mrs. Faulks was close to the Jensens' daughter, Lorraine.
Mrs. Faulks employed Dr. Patterson about two years before her death.
She loaned him large sums of money for investment in real estate and in the
doctor's airplane. A year before she died, in the fourth will she made after her
husband's death, Mrs. Faulks forgave several thousand dollars of the doctor's
indebtedness to her. In the following months she loaned him additional money,
paid his debts, purchased real estate for him, and gave him cash - for a total
value of more than $14,000 at the time of her death. During this period, according to a parade of witnesses,
[h]er conversation was always about the Doctor and it gradually grew
more and more that way. She expressed feelings of sympathy and sorrow
for him.
. . . We started a subject and then she would stop it and talk about
Dr. Patterson. That was every time I went there. She did not carry on
a conversation on the same subject very long. It would always turn to the
doctor. She was always telling how nice he was, how wonderful a doctor
Her manner was different when she referred to him ....
she had ....
She was kind of happy and smiled. The last time I was there she sat on
114

246 Wis. 319, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1945).
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the studio couch . . . with her hands folded and . . . looked at the sky

and just beamed about the doctor.
...
She felt sorry for him. She said she
guessed he was the son she
never had. She requested him to come and see her every day . . .but not

to put himself out if he was busy. At one time she made the remark to
me, "I don't know why I've taken such a liking to Dr. Patterson." * * *
She mentioned to me that she wished she had more money than she did
have. She said to try and help Dr. Patterson build a hospital for the city.
She said she would like to live another year at least to see Dr. Patterson
become famous.
. ..

She referred to him as Dear Pat, Dear Doctor. When she spoke

about him she always seemed to be very happy....

She used to tell me

how good he was. He would come up there every night when he was so
tired.
I always liked her as an old friend.... She kept up with current
events up to two or three years ago. She had a radio and spent time with
that. She talked with me about things she heard over the radio. The last
.

couple of years she did not do this .... I don't think she was well. The

last couple of years I visited her it wasn't much only Dr. Patterson.'"5

When a cousin of the testatrix once appeared to disparage Dr. Patterson's professional competence, Mrs. Faulks drove her from the house and later disinherited her.
During that conversation the subject came up regarding a patient that
Dr. Patterson had had. It was an old neighbor of ours, Mrs. Nickel. I
said something to Mary respecting the condition of this patient. I said
her hip had only partly knitted and she wasn't well. .

.

. She had been

a patient of Dr. Patterson. I was just telling her what I had learned. When
the visit ended she told me to get out of the house and stay out. I learned
after that there had been a will by Mary cutting me off entirely. 1"
Half of the last two years of Mrs. Faulks's life was spent in Dr. Patterson's
private hospital. During her intermittent hospitalization, Dr. Patterson gave
her flowers, took her out of the hospital for admittedly risky airplane rides, and
took her (at her expense) for a vacation in Wyoming.
Will and Pearl Jensen eventually confronted Mrs. Faulks with their opinions
about her beneficence to the physician. This proved a psychologically naive
thing to do. Within a month Mrs. Faulks had ordered Will out of her presence
and executed a new will in favor of Dr. Patterson. The will was not drawn
by Mrs. FaulUs's regular lawyer but by new counsel, who was summoned to Mrs.
Faulks's hospital bed by one of Dr. Patterson's nurses. There was no significant
evidence of lack of capacity at the time the will was executed.
The probate judge found against the will in favor of Dr. Patterson and
admitted the earlier will that merely forgave his indebtedness to Mrs. Faulks.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, three members dissenting, reversed. The
115 Id. at
116 Id. at

-

-,

17 N.W.2d at 429-30.
17 N.W.2d at 430.
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appellate court's view of the relationship suggests the essential human fact it
had to decide on the record:
Here was an elderly woman with a serious heart ailment living alone,
attended by a faithful and competent physician, as she believed an unusually competent one . .

. Under the circumstances there is nothing

strange about her attachment. The extent of it is perhaps unusual but not
infrequent. A doctor might well hesitate before accepting such gratuities
from a patient. Such transactions are in the minds of the general public
subject to the inference that something wrong has occurred. Offers from
clients and patients to make gifts of considerable value are not at all
uncommon in the experiences of lawyers and doctors. While a sensitive
man might not accept such gifts, there is no rule of law which prohibits
it. 117

This is the essence of the appellate majority's view of the case, and it
significantly resembles Dr. Eissler's view as to what the law ought be. To arrive at the conclusion, the court had to make several preliminary judgments.
The first was that the doctor had not done anything. "The [trial] court .. .
found that . . . the proponent was disposed to influence the deceased," the

court said. "We are unable to find a single shred of testimony -insupport of this
finding.""' 8 One of the dissenters, however, in reference to Dr. Patterson's
suggestion to Mrs. Faulks that the Jensens were eager for inheritance, was moved
to suggestive rhetorical questions:
It, also, is evident that Jensen and others were not excluded from her
consideration as objects of her bounty until after appellant's suggestion to
her that Jensen was not cordial in his relations to him. Was that an
innocent observation? Were other acts referred to in the opinions . . .
unselfish, not colorable and prompted by design? 11"9
Secondly, the court observed that the bequest to Dr. Patterson was causally
unrelated to his relationship with her. In the majority's view, the change in will
was precipitated by the Jensens, who attacked Mrs. Faulks's beneficence to her
physician and who deserted her after she drove Will Jensen from her hospital
room:
Death is a great leveler and a great solvent of human relations and however deep their resentment might have been ... if there was nothing more
between them than her request that they stay away, they would have
attended her funeral [which they did not] and made some inquiry in
regard to her .... 120

In the view of the dissenters, who insisted on similar moral fulminations in the
other direction, this alienation was the product of Dr. Patterson's design:
The quarrel with the Jensens ... explains cutting them off . .. [but] does
not apply to their daughter Lorraine. There was no quarrel with or misconduct by her .... Cutting off Lorraine in favor of one for whom only

a foolish infatuation existed, was unnatural and indicates some mental
117
118
119
120

Id.
Id.
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abnormality or impairment . . . . It would also seem that something must
have been done by the doctor between the making of wills . . . whereby
the doctor was given nothing and the will . . . wherein he was forgiven

debts of $13,600.... The relation between the doctor and his patient was
manifestly very close. The influence attributable to the confidential nature
of that relation that the doctor might exert upon his patient in view of
her age and physical condition is very great. But for that confidential
relation the view of this court would be correct, but that relation existing
I think that the conclusion of the county
court that undue influence was
21
exerted by Dr. Patterson is justified.'
Ultimately, the dissenters make the object of all this affection the villain, as
the majority had done in Kauffman.
[T]he bestowal of $14,700, to say nothing of $40,000 or more, can hardly
be accounted for except by inference that his such service was rendered
with the purpose of securing benefactions as a result of it. The doctor...
knew that. she was an "easy mark." The conclusion that he took advantage of the confidential relation that exists between doctor and patient . . . can hardly be avoided. The doctor clearly did not take his
patient up in an airplane for her health. That he did this for his own
rather than her good, went with her to Yellowstone Park, gave her two
hundred forty-nine days' hospitalization, paid for an eye operation which
he himself was unable to perform and made countless unnecessary calls,
all beyond the requirements of professional duty . . . and poisoned her

mind against Mr. Jensen, all as means of influencing benefactions to himself, was not an unreasonable inference for the trial judge to draw.'12
Most of the majority opinion in Faulks is given over to analysis of two
legal questions: whether the burden of proof shifts, in an undue influence case, to
the proponent of the will; and whether the existence of a confidential relationship raises a presumption of undue influence. But the essence of the decision,
in the midst of an interminable exposition of precedent, is in the relationship
between doctor and patient and, as a sort of counterpoint, the relationship
between Mrs. Faulks and her sometime surrogate son, Will Jensen. The thrust
of the majority's conclusion on the recondite legal questions is that the existence of the relationship itself is not enough to invalidate the will, however
intense the relationship may be and however unusual its testamentary product.
The majority stated the rule thus:
[he mere existence of a confidential relation between a testator and a
beneficiary under his will such as attorney and client, physician and patient,
priest and parishioner, confidential advisor and his advisee, etc., does not
of itself constitute undue influence, nor cast upon the beneficiary the burden
of disproving undue influence. However, the existence of such a relationship may cause a court to scrutinize the evidence more closely and weigh
it more carefully. When coupled with other circumstances such as the
activity of the beneficiary in procuring the drafting and execution of the
will or a sudden and unexplained change in the attitude of the testator
121 Id. at
, 17 N.W.2d at 444-45.
122 Id. at -, 17 N.W.2d at 444. The paragraph quoted in the text illustrates two of the
"principles of the common law" that I find helpful to a wills teacher: (1) people are no
damned good; and (2) it's not the principle of the thing, it's the money.
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or some other somewhat persuasive circumstance, it gives rise to an inference 123of undue influence which the proponent has the burden of rebutting.
The dissenters in effect accepted this standard: their real disagreement was
on the facts presented, facts that they felt were sufficient to show that Dr.
Patterson was a man of evil heart.
Inferences, presumptions, and the burden of proof theories are of no assistance at all in resolving this sort of case. These are only means for disguising
a decision that turns, despite the court's protestations to the contrary, on a
judicial view of human relationships. One cannot imagine that the evidence
could have been presented more fully - from Dr. Patterson or anyone else
concerned in the estate, nor from disinterested witnesses, medical or lay. Dr.
Patterson might, had the votes gone the other way, have been said to have the
burden of explaining what happened, but he could not have added anything to
the record except clinical psychological terms (assuming, which is probably
true, that he did not procure the will by overt manipulation). No amount of
procedural sophistry was needed in the case. What the court had to decide, and
what it necessarily decided, was that a gift so clearly the product of transference
was allowable within the limits of freedom of testation. And what the dissenters
would have had the court decide was that physicians should not be permitted
to accept gifts which are so clearly the product of transference.
C. The "Unconscious Opportunism" Case
In In Re Pitt's Estate,"4 Julie H. Pitt, a strong-willed, frontier Arizona
businesswoman, gave almost all of her estate to Guy Anderson, her lawyer. She
was a widow the last eleven years of her life; she depended on Anderson for
legal assistance and companionship in time of stress. When she first suggested a
will in Anderson's favor - and asked him to draft it for her - he expressed
surprise at her choice. She told him that she was making the will because
Anderson had been her husband's friend. Anderson saw to it that another
lawyer drafted that will, but took care of later versions of it himself. There was
no evidence of Anderson overtly manipulating Mrs. Pitt; in fact, there was a
great deal of evidence that she was self-reliant and even stubborn in this and
all other property transactions. The question, as the Arizona court saw it, was
whether the coincidence of three facts - "[o]ne, that Anderson occupied a
confidential relationship to Mrs. Pitt . . . . Two, that he was active in the
preparation of the wills. Three, that he was the principal beneficiary""' was enough to require a presumption of undue influence that would survive
Anderson's denial that he had influenced or attempted to influence the testatrix.
The Arizona court decided that it was not and reversed a jury verdict against
the will, a verdict the court saw as "supported by nothing beyond speculation,
suspicion and bottomless inference."' 2 6 The same court made a similar analysis
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in a more recent case in which the confidentially related legatee was the testatrix's
127
husband.
In another case 8 of this type, Mabel Banta was rescued from a lonely,
grieving widowhood by her niece, fla Green, and her niece's husband. She
left an apartment in Chicago and moved into the Greens' home in Rockford,
Illinois. Within a month, with the help of the Greens' lawyer, Mrs. Banta executed trust documents and a will in favor of the Greens; these largely disinherited the contestant, a nephew. The Illinois appellate court affirmed a jury
verdict finding the will to be the product of undue influence. The evidence
included testimony that Mr. Green had peremptorily urged Mrs. Banta to make
a will. The court spoke of the relationship as one involving a fiduciary:
Under certain circumstances, a presumption will arise that the instrument is the result of undue influence. One such circumstance is: where
a fiduciary relationship exists . . . where the testator is the dependent
and the . . . legatee the dominant party; where the testator reposes trust
and confidence in the ... legatee, and where the will is prepared by or its
preparation procured by such ... legatee. Proof of these facts will establish a prima
fade case that the execution of the will was the result of undue
129
influence.
An interesting aspect of the case was a tendered instruction that would have
charged the jury that "any degree of influence over another acquired by kindness and attention, can never constitute undue influence"; the court held that
the instruction was properly refused. "[W]hether the influence is . . . undue
depends not on the manner of influence, but on the degree of influence."' 3'
In another case,' 3' Dr. Urich A. Fritschi divorced his wife and made his
receptionist a principal legatee in his will. In a codicil, the only instrument
contested, he rearranged the disposition so that his children, rather than the
receptionist, bore death taxes. He died six days later. There was some evidence
of mental deficiency, but not enough to establish incapacity. The California
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed a verdict for the contestants. The
substantial inroads that death taxation has made on the freedom of testation,
the court said, "have served to sharpen the court's vigilance in protecting the
testator's right to be free of interference in the area which remains to him."
According to the court, undue influence cannot be found unless the evidence

shows: (1) a confidential relationship, (2) an "unnatural will," and (3) the
legatee's activity in procuring the will. The third element was not met. "[T]he
record does not show that . . . she ever or at all discussed the wills with the
testator." Evidence that she was greedy or that she spent a great deal of time
with the doctor would not suffice to meet the third requirement. "Plaintiffs have
failed to show that the alleged ability and desire of Mrs. Teed unduly to influence the decedent were ever brought to bear upon the testamentary act."'3 2
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In re Estate of Harber, 102 Ariz. 285, 428 P.2d 662 (1967).
Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88, 234 N.E.2d 91 (1968).
Id. at 99-100, 234 N.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 105, 234 N.E.2d at 99.
In re Estate of Fritschi, 60 Cal. 2d 367, 384 P.2d 656, 33 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1963).
Id. at -,
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Fritschi is similar to a later California case, In re Estate of Straisinger,"' in
which an elderly widow changed her principal beneficiaries from a missionary
society to two close friends. The testatrix, Maude Straisinger, often referred to
one of the legatees, Gladys Uldene Cunningham, as her "foster" or "adopted"
daughter - although Mrs. Cunningham was neither. The court thought this
confusion made the will less "unnatural" than it would have been without the
confusion and held - as in Fritschi- that opportunity to influence, and even
motive, would not be enough to raise a presumption. "There must be activity
on the part of a beneficiary in the matter of the actual preparation of the will."""
In yet another case,' 35 Mary Smith, an eighty-two-year-old widow, was
hospitalized in Liston Falls, Maine. Marion M. Chambers, a trained and
registered nurse, was hired to care for her. Mrs. Smith drew a check for $3,500
on her bank in Lewiston, handed it to Mrs. Chambers, and asked Mrs. Chambers
to take the draft to the bank. Mrs. Chambers returned with a cashier's check,
whereupon Mrs. Smith endorsed the check, handed it to Mrs. Chambers, and
told her she was making a gift of the money - which represented about a third
of Mrs. Smith's estate. The court of last resort in Maine held that the transfer
was presumptively the product of undue influence:
[The] rule is that, whenever a fiduciary or confidential relation exists
between the parties to a deed, gift, contract or the like, the law implies a
condition of superiority held by one of the parties over the other, so that in
every transaction between them by which the superior party obtains a possible
benefit equity presumes the existence of undue influence and the invalidity
of the transaction, and casts upon that party the burden of proof of showing
affirmatively by clear evidence that he or she acted with entire fairness and
the other party acted independently, with full knowledge and of his own
volition free from undue influence. 36
The court's opinion made it clear that the holding was based on the relationship
between the two ladies and that the court did not expect that the nurse could
conceivably explain away the judicial inference of undue influence:
Mrs. Smith was entirely dependent upon her nurse for her every care and
comfort, including the administration of the opiate when her cravings for
the drug and the sufferings of her body demanded relief. There can be
no doubt that a confidential relation existed between Mrs. Smith and her
nurse. Indeed, it would be difficult to visualize a more complete condition
of dependence and trust between any patient and her caretaker. It is an
entirely warranted conclusion that, even permitting Mrs. Smith, without
impartial and disinterested advice, to make this transfer of this large sum
of money to her, the defendant Marion M. Chambers took an unconscionable and unfair advantage of her patient. The presumption of fraud which
the law casts upon7 transactions of this kind is not overcome by the evidence.
It is confirmed."
In all of these cases some unconscious manipulation of the testator seems
133
134
135
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247 Cal. App. 2d 574, 55 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at , 55 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
Gerrish v. Chambers, 135 Me. 70, 189 A. 187 (1937).
Id. at 74, 189 A. at 189.
Id. at 78, 189 A. at 191-92.
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likely; in all of them the ability to manipulate unconsciously, the "unconscious
opportunism," arises out of an apparent transference. The difference in them,
which merits fuller discussion below, is that some of the cases (Mrs. Pitt, Mrs.
Banta, Mrs. Smith) involve a socially useful professional relationship, while
others (Dr. Fritschi, Mrs. Straisinger) involve personal relationships in which
the isolation and judicial treatment of the transference are more difficult.
D. The No-Manipulation Case
Dr. Lunette Powers,""8 a spinster and a physician, gave almost all of her
half-million-dollar estate to her best friend, the wife of the lawyer who drew
her will. A jury verdict against the will was reversed in the will's third trip to
the Supreme Court of Michigan. The holding turns on procedural error, but
the opinion intimates, and a concurring opinion emphasizes, that the Michigan
rule on undue influence was involved in the case. "The issue of the relationship
of the attorney and his client, and the attorney and his wife as beneficiaries, is
an . . . element in the broader concept of undue influence,"'3 9 the majority
said. The evidence showed that Dr. Powers was very dose to her lawyer's wife
and that she had suffered progressive mental disability in the months before
the will at issue was made. But for the procedural errors in the case, the verdict
would have been affirmed on the theory that Dr. Powers lacked testamentary
capacity; the concurring opinion was directed principally to the view that an
additional theory, the law of undue influence, ought to reach this lawyer-client
relationship:
When the fiduciary so benefited directly or indirectly, happens to be a
lawyer-scrivener of the challenged testament, the burden of overcoming the
presumption quite obviously is substantially greater than had an independent
and disinterested person prepared the testamentary instruments .... [T]his
Court ... [has] bluntly warned the profession against such conduct .... 140
Even the majority suggested that the Michigan state bar procedure for unethical conduct was relevant in considering the lawyer's conduct, and noted that
"[i]f any prizes were to be awarded for dismal professional judgment, the pro41
ponent here would be in a fair way to be signally recognized."'
There is, in Powers, no evidence that the legatee's husband held any sway
over Dr. Powers. There is little evidence that a transference relationship existed
between Dr. Powers and the legatee. Dr. Powers gave her estate to friends, the
evidence showed, because she had no close relatives. If the court in Michigan
is willing to invalidate this kind of will, it is not because there was an emotional
tie that produced the will, but because the court wishes to punish an errant
lawyer." It is important to note, though, that neither the concurring opinion
138
139
140

In re Powers' Estate, 375 Mich. 150, 134 N.W.2d 148 (1965).
Id. at 157, 134 N.W.2d at 151.
Id. at 181, 134 N.W.2d at 164. See In re Wood's Estate, 374 Mich. 278, 132 N.W.2d

35 (1965).

141 In re Powers' Estate, 375 Mich. 150, 157, 134 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1965); see note 21
supra.
142 Estate of Karabatian, 170 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1969) is a recent confirmation of this
determination. See also Matter of Casey (Sur. Ct. 1969), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1969, at 16;
-1 J. STORY, EaUITY JURISPRUDENCE 301 (12th ed. 1877); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 575 (1968);
Comment, 38 Miss. L.J. 156, 159 (1966).
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nor the majority goes this far. Nothing these judges say justifies the conclusion
that they would, on this professional ground, invalidate the will. What they do
say is that the lawyer may have the burden of explaining how it came about.
This use of the presumption is altogether different from the Wisconsin court's
use of it in Faulks or the Maine court's use of it in Mrs. Smith's case. In those
cases no explanation from the legatee was likely and none was expected. In
Powers, on the other hand, the lawyer involved would probably have been able
to show that no transference relationship existed between him and Dr. Powers. 4"
IV.

Synthesis

A differentiation among these four classes of cases can be made both psychologically and on the basis of ancient, often neglected, common-law authority.
It is helpful, first, to remove from consideration the case of conscious manipulation (Kaufmann)."' Transference illuminates such cases, makes proof easier
perhaps, explains something about the way people are, but is not essential to
solution. Cases like Kaufmann may even be disposed of as involving fraud in
the inducement. Fraud theory requires a showing of false representation, but
the manipulation of a transference is false representation. Love is as much a
fact as residence, age, or digestion. It is just as capable of being falsely represented. (Dr. Eissler, for instance, falsely represents "unambivalent love" for benign ends; Freud refused to make that false representation to his Dora.)
If the law can take cognizance of false representations about the loyalty or
honesty of third persons," 5 it can take cognizance of the falsity in a person
who pretends love in order to gain property."' But even if the law of fraud
won't do that, the law of undue influence has shown itself capable of dealing
with cases like Kaufmann.
The other three cases - "let it happen,,' "unconscious opportunism," and
"no manipulation," unconscious or otherwise - are more difficult for two
reasons. First, they often seem to involve the results of human affection, which
the law ought honor, not frustrate. 47 Second, they are not often accessible to
the judicial process. Although proof of transference is not unduly difficult psychotherapists of all faiths seem able to detect it - proof of unconscious
influence by the object of transference would often be very difficult."'
One possible approach would be to apply to all three kinds of cases an
equitable version of the Durham test: 49
' "If a will is the product of a transference
(i.e., a displacement of feeling, or affect, which is inappropriate in the judgment
of an informed fact finder), it is invalid." That would be a fairly workable
143 1 J. STORY, supra note 142, at 311-26.
144 See Grondziak v. Grondziak, 12 Mich. App. 61, 162 N.W.2d 354 (1968); Lipson v.
Lipson, 183 S.2d 900 (Miss. 1966), noted in 38 Miss. L.J. 156 (1966).
145 1 W. Bowa, & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 15.4, at 721-22 (1960).
146 See id. at §§ 15.1 -. 14.
147 E.g., In re Estate of Harber, 102 Ariz. 285, 428 P.2d 662 (1967); Galvan v. Miller, 79
N.M. 540, 445 P.2d 961 (1968).
148 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 15.1 (1960); see Richardson v. Bly, 181
Mass. 97, 63 N.E. 3 (1902).
149 "[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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test, since transference is not nearly as difficult to establish as the "mental defect"
of the Durham rule. But this test perhaps limits freedom of testation more than
our legal tradition will allow. Dr. Eissler says "it would actually lead to an infringement upon the patient's freedom if he could make a valid will only by
excluding his psychiatrist."' 5 0 One might disagree with him; one might nobly
disagree with the proposition that a man may make a will in favor of his
lawyer.' 5' But it is probably too restrictive to deny that one should be free to
make a will in favor of his (ordinary) physician, his nurse, his housekeeper, his
brother or sister, or his best friend.' 52
If my judgment as to the sentiment of those who mold the common law
is correct, I am left where the Faulks court was left; I must suggest a plus factor:
Transference plus something equals undue influence. What is the plus factor
to be? Is it possible to formulate it more informatively than the cases and texts
have done to date?. 5 In the "let it happen" (Faulks) case, there is good common-law authority for holding the legacy invalid. The theory rests in cases
where T is influenced by A to make a gift to B, or where T is influenced by A
to make a gift to A and B.1 4 In both situations B's legacy fails. The same result
would obtain for "unconscious opportunism" if an unconscious, probably neurotic, third force could be equated, at least metaphorically, to a third person.
One might say that the only difference between the "let it happen" case
and the "unconscious opportunism" case is that in the latter (Pitt, Swenson
[Mrs. Banta], Fritschi) the object of the transference was not sufficiently aware
of what was going on to be negligent about it. The third force still produced
the legacy. The object's innocence should be irrelevant, just as B's innocence
is irrelevant when he receives a gift as the result of A's undue influence.' 5 This
argument stumbles, though, when it reaches the "no manipulation" class of
cases, where unconscious influences were projections from the testator. One distinction might be that in this fourth class of cases the force of transference is
weaker. In Jungian terms the transference is probably not a third force at all.
The transference is still purely projection at what Jung called the level of "personal unconscious." Even so, drawing the line here - allowing the transferencecaused gift to stand - seems arbitrary and, more important, establishes a distinction that is likely to be impossible to make on specific conglomerations of
evidence.
Transference is of more value to the law if it is used to support a line of
distinction between the "let it happen" and "unconscious opportunism" cases.
The object of the "let it happen" transference is aware of what is going on. He
may not be able to diagnose the emotional climate precisely, but he comprehends
150 K. EiSSLER, supra note 1, at 231.
151 See In re Estate of Taylor, 423 Pa. 276, 223 A.2d 708 (1966) ; Stapleton, The Presumption of Undue Influence, 17 U. NEw BRUNSwicK L.J. 46, 53 (1967); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d
575, 585-87 (1968).
152 Galvan v. Miller, 79 N.M. 540, 445 P.2d 961 (1968); see Vantrease v. Carl, 410
S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. 1966).
153 See 3 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE oN WILLS § 29.81, at 591-97 (1961). Bowe and
Parker attempt to enumerate the "plus factors." Id. § 29.81, at 602-7.
154 1 W. Bown & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 15.9 (1960).
155 Id. at 737; 1 J. STORY, supra note 142, at 311.
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it and allows the benefits of it to flow to him inappropriately.'5 6 He will often
be what Rogers calls a "helping person" whose ideals are to accept emotions for
professional ends: a medical person, therapist, teacher, or lawyer (e.g., Dr. Patterson in the Faulks case). The law can workably and fairly require that the
results of influence from these professional "helping" relationships be confined
to their appropriate compensatory ends; any "let it happen" gifts will thus be
disallowed. There is some ancient authority for this proposition in an opinion
by Lord Langdale often cited as a leading case on undue influence in inter vivos
transactions.
In that case,"'r Dennis Chandler owed his solicitor more money than he
had available. The solicitor, Barsham, suggested that Chandler convey real
estate to him and prepared the necessary deed. Chandler refused, argued with
Barsham, consulted members of his (Chandler's) family, argued some more,
and then finally - after Barsham unsuccessfully offered property for trade in
addition to the debt-signed the deed. Members of the family sued to set the
deed aside, arguing that it was obtained by fraud and undue influence. The
jury found for Barsham on the fraud issue, but found for the family on the
question of undue influence. Barsham moved for a new trial; the Master of the
Rolls (Lord Langdale) granted the motion.
Langdale's opinion made a number of important distinctions about undue
influence. The first was between undue influence and fraud; he said that the
jury finding on that issue meant "there was no deception and no misrepresentation or suppression of truth." Undue influence, therefore, does not involve
falsehood. This is a seminal distinction, which American courts, by use of
rhetoric suggesting that undue influence is a species of fraud, have incorrectly
5
ignored.'
Langdale also distinguished between two species of undue influence. The
first species turns on the existence of a relationship in which "there is... great
. ..inequality between the transacting parties... habitual exercise of power on
the one side, and habitual submission on the other... [for example] transactions
between parent and child . . . [or] solicitor and client."' 59 The other species
rests on circumstances--"on the nature of the transaction and the fact of habitual
or occasional influence."' 60 The difference is in the proof necessary to make the
case. In the habitual relationship situation the act complained of can be set
aside "without any proof of the exercise of power beyond that which may be
inferred from the nature of the transaction itself."''
According to Langdale the
court could, in this first situation, "impute" undue influence. In the second
156 "The question in such cases does not turn upon the point whether there is any intention to cheat or not; but upon the obligation, from the fiduciary relation of the parties, to make
a frank and full disclosure." 1 J. STORY, supra note 142, at 311. See O'Rourke v. O'Rourke,
167 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1969); Comment, 38 Miss. L.J. 156, 158-59 (1966).
157 Casborne v. Barskam, 2 Beav. 76, 48 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Exch. 1839). There is some
authority both ways for the proposition that the rules on confidential relationship do not apply
in wills cases as they do in inter vivos transfer cases. 3 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON
WILLS § 29.84, at 600 (1961). 1 J. STORY, supra note 142, at 296-326 discusses the subject
in great detail without affirming the distinction.
158 See note 161 infra, and accompanying text.
159 Casborne v. Barsham, 2 Beav. 76, -, 48 Eng.Rep. 1108, 1108-9 (Exch. 1839).
160 Id. at -,
48 Eng. Rep. at 1109.
161 Id.
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situation, however, where the influence is occasional or circumstantial, "it is
required to shew that some advantage was taken, or that there was some fear,
some use of threat or of undue practice or persuasion."' 2 He felt that it was
within the province of the court to decide which type of undue influence was
involved, and that only the second type presents a question for a factual determination on the relationship itself.
Another distinction is subtle and important. Langdale's finding that
Chandler's deed was not the product of undue influence turned on Chandler's
susceptibility to a wide array of influences-especially from members of his
family who opposed the transfer. 6 This fact, in addition to the fact that
Chandler argued with Barsham and resisted signing the deed for some time,
apparently suggested to the Master of the Rolls that Chandler acted out of
considered self-interest rather than "by the undue influence of Barsham, as a
solicitor." The case seems to hold that the solicitor-client relationship fell within
the "imputed influence" category, but that the evidence was sufficient to prove
that no controlling influence was exerted.
An earlier English opinion,164 this by Lord Eldon, rested the distinction
between the two kinds of influence on an affective relationship, not on a legal
or formal association having a clear beginning and a clear end. In this case,
Ann Kerby, an octogenarian widow, had bought an annuity from her former
attorney. The price of the annuity was arguably excessive. Lord Eldon set the
transaction aside. The principal defense was that the attorney-client relationship
had been dissolved before the transaction, but, Lord Eldon held, "it is the confidence [which] must be withdrawn." If the affective relationship remained,
it was up to the attorney "to have acted with more providence and attention
than are required even in the case of parent and child."165 "It is asked," Lord
Eldon continued, "where is that rule to be found?"
I answer, in that great rule of the Court, that he, who bargains in a matter
of advantage with a person placing confidence in him is bound to shew, that

a reasonable use has been made of that confidence; a rule applying to
trustees, attorneys, or any one else3 66

He secured the rule procedurally with a presumption-a procedural holding that
is clearer here than Lord Langdale's imputation was in Casborne v. Barsham:
It is necessary to say broadly, that those, who meddle with such transactions,
take upon themselves the whole proof, that the thing is righteous. The
circumstances, that pass upon such transactions, may be consistent with

honest intentions: but they are so delicate in their nature, that parties must
not complain of being called on to prove, they are s.U

These are equitable principles that suggest a relatively ancient and philosophi162 Id.
163 Langdale even suggested that these plaintiffs knew more than they submitted in evidence. "[I]t seems singular that they should not have stated what were the motives which
Barsham offered to induce the father to execute the deed against their objections." Id.
164 Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. Jr. 266, 31 Eng. Rep. 1044- (Ch. 1801).
165 Id. at
, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
166 Id. at--,
31 Eng. Rep. at 1050.
167 Id. at--,
31 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
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cally sound rule for distinguishing cases involving a perceived relationship from
those undoubtedly involving real psychic interchange but which are probably
too subtle to be handled by the blunt instruments of the law. The rule suggests
that the Wisconsin court was wrong in Faulks and the Arizona court wrong in
Pitt. Both cases involved professional relationships and strong transference. On
the other hand, the rule would support the Illinois court in Mrs. Banta's case,
the California court in Fritschi, and the Maine court in Mrs. Smith's case. It
would support also the Michigan court in Powers, but indications from that
opinion imply that the relationship could be explained to exclude Lord Langdale's imputation of undue influence.
The operation of transference in undue influence cases suggests that the
law ought draw a distinction between the "let it happen" transfer and cases
of unconscious manipulation. In "let it happen" cases the proponent or transferee ought be required to show that the contested transfer was not the product
of unreal psychological disturbances in the transferor or testator. Most relationships of the "let it happen" type are "helping" relationships, professional
associations that the law ought to protect. In these cases the helping person involved ought to be required to demonstrate that the transfer of property to him
by patient or client is consistent with the positive value the law seeks to protect
in the relationship. 6 If retention of the transferred property is not consistent
with the ideals expressed in the relationship, the transfer ought to be set aside.
This is simply a vindication of the professional trust involved-something the law
protects through evidentiary privileges and legally sanctioned status symbols, and
which it ought to protect in the field of gratuitous transfers.
In a few other cases (Mrs. Banta's case is an example), the "let it happen"
transfer has not been made in a professional relationship, but the relationship is
so much like professional trust, so strongly fiduciary, that it deserves the same
protection. The test, as Lord Eldon said in Gibson, is whether the facts indicate
human confidence justifiably reposed.
There are some few "let it happen" cases-Fritschifor example-in which
the transfer ought not be set aside because the relationship is unimportant." 9
Such results can be categorized as exceptions to a general rule on "let it happen"
transfers, or they can be regarded as not included in a rule that purports to
reach only professional relationship "let it happen" cases. Even if the abstract
rule fails to reach them, it is probable that the proponent can show, on the
evidence, that transference, if any, was not strong enough to come within the
evidentiary boundaries of the rule I am suggesting. (My suggestion is that the
proponent be required to justify the transfer; in cases like Fritschi and Powers
the evidentiary requirement can probably be met by the proponent.)
It is too much to hope that future generalizations about undue influence in
appellate literature will turn only on the value of helping-person relationships
and that the courts will abandon their traditional reliance on gimmicks such
168 "If the means of personal control are given, they must be always restrained to purposes
of good faith and personal good." 1 J. STORY, supra note 142, at 297; see id. at 323-26.
169 S. BAILEY, WILLS 76, 80 (6th ed. 1967). See 1 W. BowE & D. PARXER, PAGE ON WILLS
§§ 15.2- .3, 15.5- .6 (1960); Annot. 25 A.L.R.2d 1429 (1952).
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as presumptions and burden of proof." But there is solid scientific ground for
some improvement in the expression of rules governing gratuitous transfers
within intimate human relationships, at least in those relationships that the law
ought to protect from the penury of its society's "helping persons."17' It would
seem that the English opinions in Casborne and Gibson pointed in that direction
long ago and that the psychological revelations of this century support those
early judicial insights.'"
I am suggesting a substantial departure from both the American majority
and minority rules as they are usually stated. The majority rule-represented
starkly by the court's opinion in Faulks-refuses to require explanations from
transferees unless some overt activity procuring the transfer can be shown. The
majority rule was formed and is maintained in psychological ignorance. It
rests on the tenuous assumption-illustrated by the Wisconsin court's treatment
of Mrs. Faulks's will-that the transferee must do something (with his hands?)
in order to influence the transferor. We have known for a long time that the influences that radiate from one man to another are far too strong and far too
subtle to be reduced to the flimsy test of overt activity.
The minority rule, as it was announced by the Michigan court recently,""
rests too heavily on illusive mechanical doctrines of evidence and, even when
those doctrines operate clearly, infringes too far on the traditional American
respect for freedom of testation. The Michigan court would raise a presumption
of undue influence (or shift the burden of proof to the transferee) in every case
where a confidential relationship (transference) is shown." 4 That rule is, I
think, too broad and mechanical. It departs too far from the distinction put by
Lord Langdale, who would have required an explanation from the transferee
only in cases where there is "habitual exercise of power on the one side, and
habitual submission on the other." The Michigan court's rule would be better
were it confined to (1) cases of overt manipulation, or (2) cases where a professional relationship is involved, or (3) cases where circumstances indicate a
de facto fiduciary relationship.
V.

The Transference Relationship in Legal Counseling

At several points this paper has made the tangential observation that
transference theory has something of value to say about legal counseling. This
impression of mine was encouragingly supported by Dr. Watson in his recent
170

See In re Wood's Estate, 374 Mich. 278, 132 N.W.2d 35 (1965); 3 W. BowE & D.
§§ 29.77-.134 (1961); Comment, 65 MicH. L. REv. 223 (1966).
171 See Brown v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 42 Ill. 2d 365, 247 N.E.2d 894 (1969); Richardson v. Bly, 181 Mass. 97, 63 N.E. 3 (1902) ; Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) ;
3 W. Bow, & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS §§ 29.84- .106 (1961); 1 J. STORY, supra note 142,
at 296-326; Stapleton, supra note 151.
172 Opinions too often begin by badly confusing undue influence with fraud or mental incapacity, as in Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. Jr. 292, 297, 32 Eng. Rep. 615, 617 (Ch. 1804). 1
J. STORY, supra note 142, at 296 is an ancient textbook source of the confusion ("constructive
fraud"); a more modem English textbook example is D. PARRY, LAw oF SUCCESSION 10 (5th
ed. 1966). See Logan v. Washington, 408 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
173 See authorities in note 170 supra.
174 See Comment, 65 MicH. L. REv. 223, 230-31 (1966); Comment, 38 Miss. LJ. 156,
160-61 (1966). See also Stapleton, supra note 151; Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 575, 594-98 (1968).
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book on psychiatry for lawyers." 5 There he develops the idea that transference
is a common phenomenon in the law office. If Dr. Watson is correct, as I
believe he is, a few paragraphs to suggest an analogy from the practice of psychotherapy may be useful.
The analogy is found in a paper by the Jungian analyst J. Marvin Spiegelman.7 0 His theory is built on an observation made by Professor C. A. Meier,
which he paraphrases as follows:
[I]n the subject-object relation, A, the analyst, in investigating his patient,
B, ever more intimately and deeply, soon finds that the "cut"-that is, the
distinction between subject and object, between himself and his patient becomes blurred. As he moves more and more into the object, the analyst
belongs to him, as
eventually finds that he cannot distinguish between what
77
his own complexes, and what belongs to the patient.
This means, Spiegelman says, that the analyst "cannot really go deeply
into the psyche of his partner without discovering his own unresolved complexes
and confusions as to what is patient and what is himself. Should he stubbornly
resist this realization about himself and the situation, he will . ..require that
the patient carry the whole burden of the contents activated."' In the process
"the analyst.., protects [both] his patient and himself from anything not quite
right in his own condition.""l
Annoyance or impatience or anxiety in the lawyer - to extract the analogy
It would be better to "acknowlaffects his clients far more than he realizes.'
edge one's fatigue, boredom, or anger . . . where it occurs, and analyze it,
jointly."''
Spiegelman believes that analysts learn from patients, and most
good lawyers would agree that lawyers learn from their clients. "To learn,
one must be ready to submit to the other and expose one's ignorance."'8 2
Spiegelman believes that members of his profession have too often let
themselves fall into one of two unsatisfactory models - the doctor-patient
model or the teacher-pupil model. Neither of these takes account of the fact
that "the relationship itself is central and .. .the desired objectivity, individuality, and understanding come out of the actual experience, rather than out
The doctor-patient
of some presumed ... objectivity" in the helping person.'
tend to be
because
doctors
produce
this
human
interaction
model does not
from
or
not aware
"technique-oriented, impersonal, often mechanical, cut off
84
when
sensitive,
enter
The
doctor
does
not,
even
of ... the spiritual factor."'
175 A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968).
176 Spiegelman, Festschrift von C. A. Meier. 1965 (translation of unpublished paper on file
with the author). Spiegelman's essay is based on Meier, Projection, Transference and the
Subject-Object Relation in Psychology, 4 J. ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1959).
177 Spiegelman, supra note 176, at 1.
178 Id. at 1-2.
179 Id. at 2.
180 See Redmount, Attorney Personalitiesand Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 972 (1961); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling,
2 CONN. L. Rlv. 98 (1969).
181 Spiegelman, supra note 176, at 3.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 5.
184 Id. at 6-7.
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into the process as an equal. Nor does the teacher-pupil model satisfy him.
"However wise a guru," he says, "[the teacher] is never quite human."' 85 It
takes too long "to simply react to the situation and the person with some naturalness and not out of a theory."
Lawyers are not analysts and clients are not in the law office for analysis.
But people who come to law offices are troubled, and the lawyers who talk to
them - whether they admit it or not - are also troubled. The best guidance
and support probably come from lawyers who intuitively appreciate and enter
into what Dr. Watson identifies as a transference relationship. Not all of
Spiegelman's personal experience is applicable to lawyers - partly because it
is so personal that not all of it is applicable to anybody but Spiegelman-but
there is much that is important and instructive for lawyers: "I found," he says,
"that I, too, was shown to be human, limited, have complexes, and not be
responding. ... I find that the best interpretations come out of what is actually
transpiring in the relationship

185
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Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.

